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ABSTRACT 
CURRENCY CRISIS CONTAGION, CAPITAL FLOWS, AND 
SOVEREIGN RATINGS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF EMERGING 
MARKETS 
BY 
JUNG YEON KIM 
Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Warwick, Department of Economics, 1998 
Followed by the introduction, we begin the thesis by focusing on 
providing a quantitative indicator of the currency crisis contagion 
during the 1997-98 East Asian crisis. The severity of contagion is 
measured using a state-space model and a technical apparatus known 
as the Kalman filter. The results show that the contagion level is 
exceptionally high during the peak of the Asian crisis from June 1997 to 
January 1998. Further econometric tests were carried out to identify 
whether the crisis is transmitted to countries linked through trade or 
to countries characterized by macroeconomic similarities. The results 
indicate that the macroeconomic similarity dominates trade linkage 
vi 
as the major crisis transmission channel. Further, the high level of 
domestic claims which were financed by foreign capital inflows were 
shown to be the most significant factor in explaining crisis contagion 
in 1997-98. 
The next part of thesis develops and implements a method for fore- 
casting capital flows to emerging markets. We provide capital flow 
forecasts to thirty-two developing countries using a vector autoregres- 
sive (VAR) framework based on the underlying fundamental factors 
driving capital flows. We also use our estimated models to carry out 
simulation exercises for the behaviour of capital flows under various 
economic scenarios. In the following part of thesis, using an unob- 
served components model and maximum likelihood Kalman filtering 
estimation, we separate out permanent and temporary components 
of capital flows. Based on these models, and using monthly data up 
to December 2000, forecasts of various capital flows are presented for 
the period January 2001 to December 2003. The results of the time 
series-based forecasts are then compared to those obtained using the 
fundamentals-based approach. 
Previous simulation exercises for the behaviour of capital flows under 
various scenarios have pointed out the significance of sovereign ratings 
in determining the size of inflows to emerging markets. Therefore, 
vii 
the final part of the thesis uses the state space form and the Kalman 
filter to illustrate that the contagion factor influenced the rating 
agencies' sovereign rating decisions in East Asian emerging markets in 
1997-98. It also shows that agencies downgraded sovereign ratings of 
the five Asian emerging markets excessively, beyond which economic 
fundamentals would justify. This exacerbated Asian emerging markets' 
cost of borrowing abroad and led to the evaporation of supply of 
international capital to them. It is proposed that rating agencies would 
have an incentive to downgrade to recover their reputation from failing 
to predict the emergence of crisis in the first place. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
During the 1990's, international financial market participants have witnessed some 
of the most severe maxket, turbulence in the post war period. The 1997-98 East 
Asian crisis can now be ranked among the most notable crises in financial history; 
the unprecedented movements in exchange rates and asset prices have destroyed 
more than U$ 1.5 trillion' of financial wealth in the affected Asian countries alone. 
In contrast to previous balance of payments-cum-currency crises where eco- 
nornic mismanagement had resulted in either large fiscal deficits or grOss mis- 
aJignment of exchange rates, the macroeconomic performance of Asia has been 
exemplary. Over the past decade, record economic growth and development were 
supported by strong economic fundamentals. Most countries ran either balanced 
or surplus fiscal accounts with little or no government debt, and high private sec- 
tor savings funded exceptional rates of investment. Even as investment surpassed 
savings, driving current account deficits wide, the fact that growth was investment 
rather than consumption driven provided a large degree of comfort. Similarly, 
monetary policy appeared to be coping well, with reported inflation rates under 
'Source from Deutsche Bank, Gobal Markets Research, November 1999 
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control. 
Much of official and academic opinion has tended to lay the responsibility 
for the crisis on fundamental economic and financial problems. Some of the 
most frequently mentioned explanations include (i) the high leverage in corporate 
balance sheets, (ii) the importance of foreign capital in financing Asian growth, 
(iii) the weak banking sector as financial intermediation, and (iv) the exchange 
rate mismanagement and investment flows. However, one question stiU remains 
unanswered. If these were the only explanations for the emergence of crisis, why 
did it occur so suddenly and almost simultaneously in so many countries? Was 
there some unobservable but nevertheless strong negative sentiment growing and 
prevailing in the whole region as an investment target when the Thai baht col- 
lapsed in early July of 1997? Did crisis spread contagiously from one country to 
another? In a period of 6 weeks, four currencies were devalued. Speculation in- 
tensified allowing the Bank of Thailand to accumulate U$ 23 billion of short dollar 
forward liabilities, and on 2nd of July, 1997, the Bank of Thailand abandoned its 
currency peg. The fall in the baht immediately raised doubts over other curren- 
cies. The Philippine peso was floated on 11th of July, and the Malaysian ringgit 
was next to come under pressure with Bank Negaxa forced to abandon its interest 
rate defence after only one week. The Indonesian rupiah followed soon, although 
the official intervention band was not discarded until the 14th of August. Up to 
this point, all ASEAN currencies had fallen by around 20% against the US dollar. 
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If this was simply a competitiveness issue, the exchange rate misaligm-nent had 
been redressed. However, currencies failed to stabilize despite the introduction 
of IMF support packages. The crisis eventually spread to Korea and Korean won 
was devalued in November 17th, 1997. 
Krugman (1998), drawing on earlier work by, in particular, McKinnon and Pill 
(1996), argues that traditional currency models fall short of an adequate explana- 
tion of the Asian crisis and proposes an alternative moral hazard model of banking 
sector instability. The moral hazaxd problem, generated when the liabilities of 
financial institutions are underwritten by implicit government guarantees which 
is likely to be an important distortion in the financial system, is at the core of the 
crisis. Since the costs of banking losses are not fully borne by the institution, 
this creates an incentive to increase lending beyond actuarially prudent levels. 
Banking sectors become increasingly unstable and vulnerable to collapse if the 
guarantee is doubted. However, the ongoing financial support from govermnents 
to major banking groups in Europe shows moral hazard is hardly unique to Asia, 
and this alone cannot justify the scale of the subsequent currency collapse. 
In our view, fundainental problems and financial system insolvencies were 
blown into debilitating systemic regional problems by herding behaviour when 
foreign financial institutions pushed excessive capital flows into emerging markets 
and by hysterical panic when they then pulled out in excessive amounts. In 
the months preceding the crisis, speculative attacks were driven in large part 
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by leveraged market participants - hedge funds, proprietary trading desks - and 
international financial institutions. It is unlikely that such funds were betting on 
inflation causing a major real exchange rate appreciation at some distant future 
time, particularly given the impressive low inflation track record over the past 
two decades. A more plausible strategy was that central banks were considered 
unable to afford a sustained interest rate defence of the currency. This creates 
an unstable equilibrium because the greater the speculative attack, the higher the 
cost of defence encouraging even more speculation. 
During the period of greatest uncertainty with currencies depreciating and 
interest rates rising, credit risk escalated to the point that the returns to holding 
almost any exposure were perceived as being negative in the near term. In addi- 
tion, the expected domestic economic contraction that was necessary to generate 
a current account surplus and finance bank recapitalisation reduced the expected 
yield on equity. A classic liquidity squeeze emerged in which foreign creditors rec- 
ognized that there were insufficient foreign exchange reserves to cover short term 
debt, and creditors "ran" the currencies. Capital flight triggered a raft of credit 
downgradings, and rating downgrades triggered loan repayments. Currency dy- 
namics after the initial devaluating were influenced by contagion. By raising the 
risk premium on foreign investment, this led to further capital outflows from the 
region. Total private capital flows to five Asian2 emerging markets most hit by 
the crisis fell from an inflow of U$ 97 billion in 1996 to an estimated outflow of U$ 
2These countries include Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Korea. 
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12 billion in early 1998, a U$ 109 billion reversal. The shift in capital flows into 
the region in only one year was equivalent to more than 10% of aggregate GDP. 
Devaluation may have created a competitive gain, but this was minor to the 
increase in cost of capital. The cost of capital doubled from 1997 to 1998, and 
the cost of equity increased dramatically as well, ranging from 40% for Malaysia 
to 70% for Philippines 3. 
In this connection, the overall aim of this thesis is to understand the finan- 
cial dynamics of emerging market economies vis-a-vis the rest of the world. We 
begin by raising the questions "Was the 1997-98 East Asian crisis due to herd- 
ing behaviour of investors? Did crisis spread contagiously from one country to 
another? " Our null hypothesis is that fundamental problems and financial sys- 
tem insolvncies wee magnified by psychological contagion or negative sentiment 
over the whole region, and may have pushed emerging markets into a spiral of 
turbulence. In chapter 2, an unobserved variable, "contagion! ', is isolated from 
the index of exchange market pressures using the state space form and a technical 
appaxatus known as the Kalman filter. We show that the contagion factor played 
an important role in causing a series of crises in East Asian emerging markets. 
We extend our studies to examine whether crises spread to countries linked by the 
trade, or to countries that shared similarities in their macroeconomic fundamen- 
tals. Our analysis shows that crisis spreads from one country to others who are 
characterized by similar high levels of domestic credit and total foreign liability 
3Source from Deutsche Bank, Global Markets Research, November 1999. 
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which had been financed by the strong inflow of foreign capitals in previous years. 
Having pointed out the importance of foreign capital in the financial dynam- 
ics of Asian economies, chapters 3 and 4 forecast capital flows into 32 emerging 
markets using the pull vs. push or fundamentals-based approach, and purely 
time series-based approach respectively. Capital flows to emerging markets are 
driven by domestic pull factors that attract foreign capital. These include the 
consumer price index, the level of domestic credit, the short-term debt to reserves 
ratio, the level of industrial production, the domestic short-term interest rate, 
credit ratings, the reserves to import ratio and the domestic stock market index. 
Global or "push! ' factors also affect the flow of capital into the region. Hence, 
the fundamentals-based approach to capital flow forecasting (chapter 3) considers 
both domestic pull factors and global push factors as determinants of flows into the 
region. The global factors taken into account in the model included global factors 
such as the strength of US output growth, US short-term and long-term interest 
rates, the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI), the US swap rate and the US 
high yield spread (as proxies for a measure of risk aversion). The time series- 
based approach to capital flow forecasting (chapter 4) analyses the times series 
characteristics of flows using an unobservable components model, and projects 
future inflows based on these chaxacteristics. The results of the two different 
forecasts axe then compared. 
Capital flow forecast under various low case scenarios in the fundamentals 
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based approach has revealed that the negative shocks to real global factors, no- 
tably the level of US industrial production, had a significant impact on capital 
flows to emerging markets. This can be attributed to the fact that many develop- 
ing countries depend on the US a prime export destination, and also because they 
often import parts and intermediate goods which are processed and assembled to 
be re-exported to the US. Also, the study reveals the importance of sovereign 
rating as a factor determining the size of capital inflows to the region. In almost 
all of the developing countries included in this research, the increases in capital 
inflow were closely related to the improvements in credit ratings. 
Noting the importance of the role credit rating agencies in determining the 
size of capital flows (and hence the growth in the emerging markets), chapter 5 
investigates the actions taken by major credit rating agencies during and shortly 
after the Asian crisis. The downgrading of sovereign ratings of 5 Asian countries 
during the 1997-98 crisis period were, collectively, the largest and the most abrupt 
changes in the modern history of credit ratings. Downgrading of this size were 
not only unusual but were also decided late in the crisis, thereby exacerbating 
market price movements and increasing instability (IMF, 1998). It is our view 
that rating agencies, having failed to predict the emergence of crisis, became 
extremely conservative, and downgraded sovereign ratings beyond a level which 
their economic fundamentals would justify. Hence, this chapter proposes that 
rating agencies would downgrade other countries excessively because failing to 
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predict another crisis would result in a damage in their reputation which would 
be difficult to restore. The results of our analysis show that the psychological 
contagion, or the negative sentiment prevailing in the region did indeed contribute 
to huge downgrading of sovereign ratings of major rating agencies during the 
period of Asian crisis. 
Finally, chapter 6 presents some concluding remarks and suggest policy im- 
plications arising from the thesis, both from the emerging markets' perspective as 
weR as the perspective of international financial institutions. 
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Chapter 2 
Measuring Currency Crisis 
Contagion and Identifying Crisis 
Transmission Channel 
2.1 Introduction 
Currency crises in the 1990s differ from those in the 1970s in a fundamental 
way: they tend to cluster. The domino collapse of Exchange Rate Mechanism in 
1992-1993, the Tequila effect of Mexican crisis in 1994, the Asian flu of 1997 and 
the emerging markets and even the global turmoil that followed the August 1998 
Russian crisis all illustrate the fact that currency crises spread from one country 
to another. 
Nevertheless, until now, there has not been any positive and statistically sig- 
nificant empirical evidence of contagion. Why is this so? Could the problem 
lie in the definition of contagion? Is it possible to isolate and estimate the level 
of contagion, and finally identify the channel of crisis transmission? Do coun- 
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tries devalue their currencies in order to maintain export competitiveness against 
other countries that devalued, or are they forced to devalue due to speculators 
who, after observing a similax market crash, become skeptical about the currency 
stability and flee the market? 
VvUle acknowledging the importance of contagion in recent currency crises, 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplose (1996) and Glick and Rose (1999) show in their 
analysis that the international trade linkage dominates macroeconomic similarities 
as the main channel of contagion. That is, crisis spreads from one country to 
another because, after observing the devaluation of a currency, trade competitors 
also devalue their currencies in order to support their export industries. They 
argue that because crisis contagion is trade linked, geographical proximity plays 
an important role and that crises axe regional. But then how can we explain the 
Asia-Russia and Russia-Brazil cases where the countries were not competing for 
the same export market and bilateral trade linkages were not as strong? 
In contrast to previous balance of payments-cum-currency crises where eco- 
nomic misaligm-nent had resulted in either large fiscal deficits or gross misalign- 
ment of exchange rates, the macroeconomic performance of Asia has been exem- 
plary. Most countries ran either balanced or surplus fiscal accounts, and high 
private sector savings funded the exceptional rates of investment. Even as rising 
investment surpassed savings, driving current account deficit wider, the fact that 
growth was investment rather than consumption driven provided a large degree 
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of comfort. Similaxly, monetaxy policy appeared to be coping well, with reported 
inflation rates under control. 
Whereas the macro fundamentals gave little indication of a traditional balance 
of payments crisis, financial imbalances had created increasingly illiquid corporate 
and banking sectors. These imbalances developed in three stages: (i) accumula- 
tion. of domestic private debt; (ii) the inflow of mainly short term foreign capital 
which created both maturity and currency mismatches, and (iii) weak regulation 
and opaque reporting practices which contributed to excessive investments in un- 
productive assets. Capital inflows per se do not create financial instability. But 
when these capital inflows are short term in nature and serve as the main source 
to fund high level of domestic credit, reliance on them could render the market 
vulnerable because short term capital is subject to rapid reversal. These capital 
inflows can be driven either by recipient country specific factors such as credit 
ratings, secondary- market prices, sovereign debt and other indicators of country 
performance, or external factors such as general level of economic activity in the 
developed world. 
Liquidity crises due to sudden reversals in capital flows seem to be a common 
element in crisis countries. For example, the debt crisis in 1982, the Mexican 
crisis in 1994 and the Asian crisis in 1997-1998 show that capital inflows can come 
to a sudden halt and even reverse sharply. The sudden reversal is more abrupt 
when capital inflows are in the form of portfolio flows or short-term capital move- 
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ments rather than direct foreign investment. Events such as the liberalization 
of capital account transactions, by allowing this type of short-term capital flows, 
may contribute to instability of the flow of reserves and undermine the ability of 
a country to peg its currency. Once a country's currency is attacked, foreign in- 
vestors, who are generally less informed than domestic investors, fear that another 
attack could occur in countries sharing similar characteristics and may begin to 
reduce their investments or even flee the market. 
Motivated by the comments by Taylor (1999) on Glick and Rose's paper on 
contagion and trade, this chapter is focused on providing a quantitative indica- 
tor of currency crisis contagion in Asia. Severity of the contagion has been mea- 
sured using a state-space model applying a Kalman filter approach (Harvey, 1989). 
The results show that the contagion level is exceptionally high during the peak 
of the Asian crisis from June 1997 to January 1998. Further econometric tests 
were carried out to identify whether the crisis is transmitted to countries linked 
through trade (both through bilateral trade and through trade competition in 
third markets) or to countries characterized by macroeconomic similarities. Vari- 
ables included in the analysis of the macroeconomic similarity include the level 
of real effective exchange rate misalignment relative to 1990, M2/reserves, real 
GDP, total foreign liability, domestic stock prices, domestic credit, and claims on 
the private sector. Contrary to Glick and Rose (1999), the results indicate that 
macroeconomic similarity dominates trade linkage as the major crisis transmission 
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channel. Further, the high level of domestic claims were shown to be the most 
significant factor in explaining crisis contagion in 1997-98. 
The chapter is structured as foUows. Section 2.2 presents the state space 
model and the Kalman filter involving an unobserved variable, and describes how 
the model has been modified for application to estimating 'contagion'. The result 
of the estimation of contagion is also reported in this section. Section 2.3 discusses 
whether the trade linkage or the macroeconomic similarity is the dominant channel 
of crisis transmission, and identifies which specific variable(s) is mostly responsible 
for crisis transmission Section 2.4 concludes and suggests some macroeconomic 
policy implications. 
2.2 The Model: Estimating Contagion 
Waves of currency crises in the 1990s have generated much interest in conta- 
gion effects. Crisis can be transmitted through trade linkages or may be a result 
of similarities in macroeconomic fundamentals. Contagion may also be due to 
the interaction between financial sector crises and the balance of payments crises 
in which a loss of investor confidence may set off a vicious cycle of capital flow 
reversals, liquidity squeezes and currency depreciation (Valdes 1996, Goldfajn and 
Valdes 1997). 
Despite some progress, previous researches do not provide positive and statis- 
tically significant empirical evidence of contagion. This is because theoretically, 
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it does not fit into the assumption that agents in the financial market are rational 
and that information is common. knowledge. However, if there are high costs 
for access to information about the healthiness of an economy, then herding be- 
havior of investors does not violate market efficiency assumptions. Empirically, 
the difficulty still remains in isolating contagion as a sole variable. This paper 
concentrates on the latter problem of presenting statistically significant evidence 
of contagion. An index of contagion is created. We then distinguish whether 
contagion is trade linked or is due to similarities in macro fundamentals, and if 
so, which variable(s) is(are) responsible for explaining crisis transmission. 
2.2.1 Data 
The data can be classified into two main groups. The first are intended to 
capture the dynamics of the financial sector, consisting of monthly financial data 
on exchange rates, money market rates, real effective exchange rates relative to 
1990, total foreign liability/GDP, stock prices, domestic credit/GDP, total claims 
on the private sector/GDP and M2/reserves. The second group of data includes 
real'GDP and bilateral and regional import-export statistics to reflect the real 
sector. The monthly data from 1994M1 to 1998M9 are from the Deutsche Bank, 
International Financial Statistics and Direction of 'Rade, from the International 
Monetary Fund and Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank statistics. 
Countries mainly affected by the 1997 Asian crises are included in this study, 
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namely: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, with 
Thailand being the country where 1997 crisis began. 
2.2.2 Estimating Contagion 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide significant and measurable 
evidence of contagion and to identify the factors that cause crises transmission. 
An index of contagion is created, and we distinguish whether crises are transmit- 
ted due to the trade linkage or due to similar characteristics in macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Further, the macro vaxiable mostly responsible for crisis contagion 
is identified. 
2.2.3 Measuring the Probability of Devaluation 
Measuring the probability of devaluation and in paxticular, proxying private 
agents' beliefs can be a difficult task. The most effective approach would be to 
observe option prices since these are highly accurate in reflecting market percep- 
tions (Campa and Chang, 1996). The problem is that such maxkets either do not 
exist or are at a very early stage of development for emerging markets. 
Therefore, in order to capture the idea of devaluation probability, the actual 
exchange market pressure(EMP) proposed by Girton and Roper (1977) is used. 
This measure is a weighted average of changes in nominal exchange rate of a 
country, the changes in interest rate and negative of changes in international 
15 
reserves. 
EMPit = a%Aeit +, 8%Aiit + -y%Arit 
eit, iit, rit axe exchange rate, interest rate and foreign reserves for country i 
at time t. The weights a, 0 and -y axe set in order to equalize the volatilities 
of three components to preclude any one of them from dominating the index. 
The intuition for using this index is that when a country faces pressure on its 
currency, the govermnent has the option to devalue or raise interest rates or run 
down reserves. Such exchange market pressure also captures speculative attacks 
that were unsuccessful in causing devaluation. 
Figure 2.1 shows the EMPs of countries hit by the Asian crisis. Larger val- 
ues represent Mgher devaluation probability. Negative values indicate investors' 
expectation of currency appreciation rather than depreciation. High exchange 
market pressures in some countries prior to 1997 Asian crisis indicate that these 
countries had been exposed to the danger of crisis but that attacks were unsuc- 
cessful. 
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Figure 2.1: Exchange inarket pressures 
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EMIR of Indonesia 
2.2.4 Application of the State-Space Form in Estimation of 
Contagion 
Currency crisis contagion can be examined by employing the state-space form 
and unobserved components model suggested by Kalman (1960) and Harvey 
(1989). A state space model consists of two equations: a measurement equa- 
tion that describes the relationship between observed variables and unobserved 
state variables, and the transition equation that demonstrates the evolution of 
the unobserved variable. 
Measurement equation: 
Yit = Xi, t-, A! +H- Bt + Eit -, it - iid N(O, R) 
(2.2) 
'Ransition equation : 
Bt =: ii +F- Bt-I + vt vt , iid N(O, Q) (2-3) 
E(Eit - vt) =0 (2.4) 
Yit is a nxl vector of variable observed at time t, Bt is a kxl vector of 
unobserved state variables that evolves in autoregressive, form. H is a nx 1 matrix 
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that links the observed Yit with unobserved Bt, ii is kxl vector of constants, vt 
is kxl. A is a matrix of parameters. If Yit is to represent the exchange market 
pressure of country i at time t, equation (2.2) can be interpreted as exchange 
market pressure as the sum of a country specific factor Xi, t-,, an unobserved and 
slowly decaying temporary contagion Bt, and purely temporary, zero persistent 
Contagion, in turn evolves in autoregressivel form. 
The Kalman filter, a recursive procedure for computing an optimal estimate 
of the unobserved state vector Bt, is then applied. In this way, it is possible to 
estimate the unobserved component and provide a minimum mean squared error 
estimate of Bt given the appropriate information set'. The unknown parameters 
in the state space form can be estimated by maximum likelihood Kalman filtering 
methods (Harvey, 1989), and can be used to predict and update the unobserved 
state variable Bt at the end of each period. 
2.2.5 Modelling the '11-ansmission of Currency Crisis 
The modeffing of currency crisis contagion used in this paper is a modified 
version of basic state space model and Kalman filter. Let Yit be the exchange 
market pressure of 6 countries (i=l.. 6) under study and ýt be the unobserved 
contagion factor common in all 6 countries. 
I It is not limited to AR(1), but can be AR(n) as long as n is finite. 
2 Information set includes the parameters il, A, F, R and Q. 
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Yit = (Xi, t-l - A! ) + (-yi - 
ýt) +, -it 
Ot -6ý 01(0t-1 - 
6) + 02(#8t-2 - 6) +Wt 
Eit : --ý 
Oil Ei, t-l+V)i2 Ei, t-2+fit 
i=1,2,3,4,5,6 (2.5) 
wt - iidN(O, 1) (2.6) 
cit - iidN(O, o,? ) (2.7) It 
u2 is set to 1 to normalize the common component. The the roots of (1 - w 
01L - 02L 
2) 
=0 and (1 - V51L -02L 
2)=O, i=L. 6 lie outside the unit circle, and 
the shocks are assumed to be independent, i. e. E(eit -vt) = 0. The conunon 
component, enters each equation of Yit with different weights, yi, i=L. 6. 
For each of the 6 series, (Xi, t-l - A') + eit represents individual, country specific 
macroeconomic variables. 
The first population moment for the ith indicator Yit consists of two compo- 
nents. 
E(Yit) = (Xi, t-l - A') + (-yi - 6) (2.8) 
However, from the corresponding sample first moment -Yi, one can not sepa- 
rately identify Xj, t-j - A' and -yib. This causes a problem in deriving the maximum 
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likelihood estimator. Such an identification problem can be avoided by demean- 
ing, that is subtracting the mean value from original value. 
Let yit = Yit - Ti = -yi ( 
ýt 
- 6) + cit and define Pt = 
ýt 
-b and xit = Xit - Ti, 
'hence we have 
yit = Aixit + -yi, 6t + eit 
Ot : -- (01 * Pt-1) + 
(02 
* A-2) + Wt 
'it ý= Oil Ci, t-1 + V)i2 Ei, t-2 +Eit 
(2.9) 
wt - iidN(O, 1) (2.10) 
2 
cit -, iidN(O, ai) 2.11 
The above model in deviation from means is written in the state space form 
and the ]Kalman filter is available for maximum likelihood estimation of the model 
based on the prediction error decomposition, as well as for inference on Ot. 
Measurement Equation: 
Yi 
t Aixit ^11 0100 
y2t A2X2t 72 00010 
L 
Ynt 
jLA,, Xnt JL0 
(n x 1) (n x 1) (n x s) (S x 
31n this case, n=6 and s=14. 
ot 
Eit 
Ot-1 
E2t 
'it + 
Ent 
LJ En, t-1 j 
(sxl)' 
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'Ransition Equation : 
ßt 01 02 00 
ßt-1 1000 
Eit 00 11 
012 
L En, t-1 jL00... 
(sxl) (sxs) 
Ot-2 
El't-1 
Cn, t-2 
(sx 
1 +1 
Wt 
0 
fit 
(sxl) 
Once the estimates of parameters using maximum likelihood estimation method 
are calculated, one can run the Kalman filter to get OtIt, the contagion at time t, 
given information up to time t. 
2.2.6 Empirical Results 
The estimates of contagion parameters and the level of contagion are reported 
in the Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2.01 and02 are the AR(1) and AR(2) coefficients of 
contagion, 8t. The variables Oil andV)i2 are the AR(1) and AR(2) coefficients of the 
shocks in the measurement equation for country i. The variable -yj represents the 
coefficient of contagion variable for the country i. The results show that contagion 
plays an important role in exchange market pressure of currencies of all countries 
under study as observed by the parameter -yj 4, ranging from 0.31 in Indonesia 
to 0.63 in Malaysia. Figure 2.2 shows estimated contagion level from 1994M1 to 
1998M9. The contagion level is especially high during the time of crisis, June1997 
4i=l.. 6, representing Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Philippines. 
and ** in table 1 indicate 5% and 1% of significance respectively. 
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to January 1998, reaching as high as 3.213 in July-August 1997. The index remains 
near zero or negative during most of the periods except for a slight increase during 
the Mexican crisis. But at no other time is the level of contagion above 1.3 except 
during the Asian crisis period. Negative numbers can be interpreted as a level of 
immunity against currency attacks, that is, even if there were dangers of currency 
attack in the region, the countries had the economic strength to defend their 
currency against severe devaluation. 
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Table 2.1 Estimates and standard errors of parameters 
EParameter 
Estimation 
I 
Standard error 
I 
Parameter 
I 
Estimation 
I 
Standard error 
01 0.6261 0.1969 062 0.0821 0.1414 
02 
-0.0980 0.0616 (Tj 0.7401 0.1469 
011 0.0869 0.1323 a2 0.7568 0.1488 
V) 
12 -0.0019 0.0058 173 0.3259 0.1147 
'021 0.2427 0.1391 a4 0.5753 0.1270 
022 
-0.0147 0.0169 0'5 0.4667 0.1187 
031 
-0.4448 0.2241 a6 0.6467 0.1345 
032 0.0567 0.2505 0.3972 0.1179 
041 0.0463 0.1292 'Y2** 0.3091 0.1281 
042 -0.0005 0.0028 73 0.6276 0.1139 
051 
-0.2799 0.1687 74 0.5326 0.1252 
052 
-0.0196 0.0237 75 0.5872 0.1078 
061 
-0.1322 1 0.1416 1, 1 76 0.4602 0.1132 
Log likelihood 
1 
-117.7594 
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Figure 2.2: Contagion from January 1994 to November 1998 
2.3 Analyzing Source of Contagion 
Glick and Rose (1999) use a measure of trade linkages to indicate real integra- 
tion across economies and conclude that crisis may spillover contagiously through 
trade links. While acknowledging geographical proximity as a characteristic of 
recent crisis transmission patterns, one can raise questions as to why the crisis 
spread from Russia to Brazil in 1998 when these countries were not competing for 
the same export market and bilateral trade links were not so strong. Could it, 
be that there are other channels of contagion such that trade linkage is a proxy 
of these channels'? Could there be some other important variables that were not 
iucluded in their analysis which concluded that inacrocconomic similarity was not 
the major channel of contagion'? 
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In this section, the contagion level derived from previous section is used to 
identify what causes currency crisis to spread from one country to another. Specif- 
icaRy, a test is constructed to determine whether crisis is contagious to countries 
linked by trade or to countries that share similar macroeconomic characteristics. 
Further, we attempt to explain which macroeconomic variable is mostly responsi- 
ble for a country's vulnerability to currency crisis. Variables used for determining 
macroeconomic similarity include real exchange rate misalignment relative 1990, 
M2/Reserves, real GDP, total foreign liability, stock prices, domestic credit and 
claims on the private sector. 
2.3.1 Measuring the Trade Linkage 
Countries affected by the Asian crisis share common characteristics in their 
geographical trade patterns. The fbHowing index is used to incorporate both 
bilateral trade linkage and the level of trade competition. Data used are from 
Direction of rRade Statistics of the IMF. 
The degree of trade integration of the home country i with country j is mea- 
sured as below (Ratzcher, 1999). 
Tradeij =EE( xjdc X xidc 
cdX. 
dc Xi. 
Xijc + Xjic (2.12) 
xi.. + xic 
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The first term indicates the degree of competition of country j for home coun- 
try i in the export market of commodity C (Xc) in the third market d. Third 
markets include industrialized countries (dj: US, Europe and Japan), developing 
countries (d2: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Nliddle East and Western Hemi- 
sphere), and other regions (d3). The laxger the export market shaxe of country 
in region d, i. e.. (Xj" ), and the higher the share for country i of total exports X. dC 
to that region d, Le ( xi" ), the more severely will country i be affected by de- Xi. 
valuation in country j. The second term measures the degree of bilateral trade 
between countries i and j, suggesting that country i wiH be affected more by a 
devaluation in country j if the volume of bilateral trade is greater between them. 
2.3.2 Measuring the Similarities in Macro Fundamentals 
To measure similarities in macroeconomic fundamentals, a country i's macro 
variable (for example, REER misalignment) Xi is regressed on country j's (j :ýi, 
countries affected by Asian crisis) values Xj, j=l.. 5 and a constant. The 
sum of estimates of the constant and residual can be interpreted as the country 
specific value, and the rest as the amount due to macroeconomic similarity. That 
is, let X be a macro variable. This vaxiable in regressed on the values of all other 
countries j =ý i, jE crisis country. 
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Xi 
-"«2 
01 + ß2X2 + ß3X3 + ß4X4 + ß5X5 +Ei ei~iid(0,1) (2.13) 
The sum of regression estimates 61 and E axe the country specific value, and 
Xi - 
(01 + C) = 02X2 + 03X3 + 04X4 + 05X5 is the proxy for similarity in macro 
fundamental variable )ý. The above identification process is carried out for all 
macro variables for aU countries under consideration. 
2.3.3 Empirical Results 
The result of multivariate regression of contagion on trade linkage and macroe- 
conomic similarity is summarized in the Table 2.2. Estimates of coefficients, stan- 
dard errors, t-values, F-statistics and measurement of fit (R? ) are reported for 
trade linkage and variables that contribute to transmission of crisis at the 5% 
significance level. Contrary to Glick and Rose's result, 1997 Asian crisis contagion 
does not appear to have been caused by trade linkage, but similarity in funda- 
mentals exhibit evidence in significantly explaining contagion. Empirically, trade 
linkages show no significance at the usual 5% significance level for any country 
except Singapore, but the sign of coefficient is negative. 
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Figure 2.3: Trade links and similarities in macroeconomic fundamentals 
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rP. Ikl, n 9 ') P. riqpq f. rn. n(zmi-, qinn rlinxinp. 
lq 
LCountry 
Vaxiable 
I 
Coefficient t-stat R? F-stat(l) F-stat(2) 
Indonesia TFL 0.1183 2.1424 0.5621 7.862 -1.097 
Stock price 0.0052 2.1814 
Dom. credit 1.1139 5.4037 
'Rade 0.8500 1.1822 
Korea Dom. credit 0.3870 2.6929 0.536 7.062 -0.584 
'Rade 0.0382 1.0574 
Malaysia Dom credit 0.1793 5.0444 0.500 6.133 -1.457 
aade 4.7063/ 1.0232 Bootstrap* 15.912* 
Singapore 'Rade* -1.7847 -1.9259 0.513 6.459 -2-0781 
TFL 0.1113 2.3556 Bootstrap* 10.966* 
Dom. credit 0.2465 3.0843 
PhUippines I M2/reserves 1 1.9326 1 2.0009 1 0.469 1 5.406 1 -0-9082 
TFL 1 0.3606 1 3.6864 
'Rade 1 1.2414 1 0.9276 
F-test of Ho: 
fl1-=fl2... =fl8: -ý: 0 (F stat(l)) was carried out to confirm the va- 
lidity of the regression as a whole 5. Results indicate the F(8,49) for all countries 
to be above the 1% significance level of 3.02. The t-values of trade linkages of all 
countries except Singapore indicate that we could not reject the null hypothesis of 
501represents the coefficient of trade linkage, and 102-168 represent coefficient of similarity in 
REER misalignment, M2/reserves, real GDP, total foreign liability/GDP, stock price, domestic 
credit/GDDP and claim on private sector/GDP respectively. 
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Ho: 01 =0 at the 5% significance level. AF test on the coefficient of trade linkage 
was carried out (Ho: 61 = 0, F stat(2)), and the result shows that one could not 
reject the null hypothesis, indicating that trade linkage is not a significant source 
of contagion. (F(1,49)=4.05 for 5%, 7.23 for 1% significance level). 
A cautionary note may be added in the analysis of such studies, as the the 
variables in the analysis are generated, and one may face generated regressor 
problem (Pagan, 1984)., It is possible that covariance matrix of parameter es- 
timates may be biased, leading to In such cases, the technique of bootstrapping 
can be used to obtain the properties of estimators. B randomly drawn samples 
of m observations, which may be less than or equal to n, the total number of 
observation, can be drawn from the original data set, and with each such sample, 
the maximum score estimator can be recomputed. One can compute the mean 
squared deviation matrix as well as other asymptotic results. The bootstrapping 
results indicated that contagion was passed through trade linkgae in only 2 out 
of 5 countries, Singapore and Malaysia, whose test statistics (16 and 11) exceed 
10% critical value of about 6. 
Although the countries show different variables as the leading source of conta- 
gion, similarity in financial variables, especially the level of total foreign liability 
and domestic credit were common explanations for crisis transmission. This can 
be attributed to the rapid growth of capital flow into the region. Especially, 
the liberalization of the financial system and the elimination of capital account 
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restriction in the region have caused a hike in total foreign liability and a rapid 
credit expansion. Domestic credit was mostly financed by foreign capital inflows 
since most countries ran either balanced or surplus fiscal accounts, with reported 
inflation under control. High domestic credit/GDP ratio accounts for the boom 
and bust in the lending cycle, and indicate a growing strain in the banking sys- 
tem which was common in Asian crisis countries. In fact, as in Latin America in 
the early 1980s, the inflow of international capital in the 1990s led to a surge in 
domestic credit and to rocketing stock and real estate prices in many countries 
in East Asia (Kaminsky, 1999). The credit boom in Asia did not result in a 
consumption boom, but led to "excessive! ' investment and a deteriorating current 
account. This time, however, the impact of the financial sector was far more 
damaging than in the Latin American case because of the deepness of financial 
markets in Asia. Unlike Latin American countries, Asian countries had more 
developed capital markets; their degree of monetization was far laxger6 and firms 
generally had much larger debt-equity ratios. 
6Domestic credit/GDP ratio in Asia was as five times larger than in Latin America at its 
peak. 
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Figure 2.4: 
Table 2.3 Financial System Domestic Credit (% of CDP) 
199)2TI9793 17994 
F1995TI996 F1997 ] 
CAGR(19 
11991T 
Indonesia 50.3 50.1 52.6 55.1 57.0 59.3 65.4 21.5 
Korea 94.5 101.6 106.4 115.4 117.9 126.8 137.9 19.0 
Malaysia 116.7 121.4 136.9 125.8 141.7 142.2 
1 
165.4 19.9 
Thailand 96.3 103.7 116.3 132.0 142.8 147.7 
1 
129.4 19.1 
Philippines 30.2 33.4 41.9 46.5 
[ý 
6 53. 
- 
65.3 
T74.8 
30.2 
Source: IMF, IFS CAG11-compound annual growth rates 
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Table 2.4COMDosition of External Debt 
US$ bln. 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total external debt 231.7 249.4 289.5 340.5 407.8 464.8 
By maturities 
Short term debt 73.3 82.2 98.5 111.3 144.7 168.3 
Medium-long term debt 158.4 .3 191.0 229.2 263.0 
296.4 
By creditors 
IFIs 33.0 32.5 34.5 36.5 36.7 33.9 
Official bilateral 54.9 61.1 68.7 82.5 86.4 80.7 
Commercial banks 110.6 118.3 129.6 157.9 208.8 258.8 
Other private creditors 33.2 37.4 56.7 63.6 
1 
75 
1 
. 9- 91. 
L 
91. 
J4 
hource: IMF, IFS Data are aggregate figures of Asian crisis countries 
More important than the problem of the size of capital inflows is the nature 
of this capital. When in crisis, capital inflows can come to a sudden halt and 
even sharply reverse their course. The sudden reversal is more abrupt when 
capital inflows are in the form of portfolio flows or short-term capital movements 
rather than direct foreign investment. Sarno and Taylor(1999a) find that private 
portfolio flows to East Asian emerging markets axe characterized by a statistically 
significant but very small permanent component. That is, private portfolio flows 
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Growth rate of external debt (%) 
(Data are aggregate figures of Asian crisis countries) 
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Figure 2.5: 
into these countries may be regarded as largely temporary and reversible in na- 
ture, increasing the vulnerability of a country to external shocks. In fact, direct 
investment into above five countries accounted for less than 23% of total capital 
inflows in 1996. Capital inflows from 1991-97 were dominated by bank lending, 
portfolio capital and non-bank credit such as bond issuance, private placements, 
and trade credits (see table 2.4). Saxno and Taylor(1999) find that the temporary 
component is, however, relatively much smaller for private capital flows to Japan 
and Australia. Official flows also displayed a relatively large temporary compo- 
nent, although smaller than for private portfolio flows and varying in size across 
countries. Note that currency attack on the Korean won occurred soinewhat later 
(November 1997) than in the rest of the Asian crlsls countries (July-August, 1997). 
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The monetary authorities could have observed the effect of loss in trade compet- 
itiveness within a 3-4 month period. Therefore, if trade linkage was indeed the 
transmission mechanism of currency devaluation, it should have been more ap- 
parent in Korea than in any other country. However, empirical evidence suggests 
that rather than trade linkage, the similarity in high ratio of domestic credit/GDP 
is the primary explanation for crisis contagion in Korea. Singapore is the only 
country where the t-value of trade linkage was significant; however, the coefficient 
shows a negative sign. 
2.4 Conclusion and Policy Implication 
In this chapter, an index has been developed to measure the level of currency 
crisis contagion using the data of six Asian countries most severly affected by the 
1997 currency crisis: Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Korea. A model was introduced in which an unobserved variable, 'contagion', 
is isolated and estimated using a state-space form and a technical apparatus known 
as the Kalman filter. Up until the first quarter of 1997, with the exception of 
the Mexican crisis period, the contagion index remained near zero or negative, 
demonstrating that the countries were immune against contagion. However, the 
index exhibits exceptionally high values during the peak of the Asian crisis (June 
1997 - January 1998). 
To understand the transmision mechanism of crises, a test was constructed to 
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investigate whether crisis was transmitted to other countries linked by trade or to 
countries showing similar characteristics in macroeconomic fundamentals. Con- 
trary to Glick and Rose (1999), we find that macroeconomic similarity dominates 
trade linkage as a the source of contagion. A high level of domestic credit was a 
particularly common factor behind crises in these countries. 
These results suggest a number of policy measures to prevent and safe-guard 
against future possible attacks. From the capital recipient country's perspective, 
diversifying the loan sources and avoiding excessive short-term financing could 
mmize negative shocks in the case of rapid capital outflow. Further emphasis 
should be placed on developing mature domestic financial markets which encour- 
age firms to raise resources tbrough equity and corporate bond issuance. Also, 
the 1997 Asian crisis is known as the 'twin crisis', as the combination of both cur- 
rency and banking crises. Therefore, it may be essential to practice more stricter 
banking supervision and regulation in order to prevent excessive lending which 
led to the financing of excessively risky projects. In line with such efforts, in- 
ternational financial institutions could set up emergency funds to assist countries 
that practice relatively sound macroeconomic policies but face temporary liquid- 
ity shortages due to contagion. Further emphasis should be placed on the role 
of international financial specialists in monitoring global financial developments, 
and in cooperating with the country desk economists in institutions such as the 
IMF and the World Bank in the assesment of a country's economic performance 
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and outlook. 
38 
Chapter 3 
Capital Flow Forecasts to 
Emerging Markets: A 
Fundamentals-based Approach 
3.1 Introduction 
The extreme turbulence in world financial markets in recent years has placed 
the role and the magnitude of foreign capital flows to developing countries under 
intense scrutiny once again. As maxkets recovered during 1999 laxgely due to 
continued growth in the US economy and the deepening of credit markets in the 
euro area, emerging markets rebounded from a series of crises that began in Asia 
in 1997. Global asset prices saw strong increases in 1999. The fundamentals 
in many emerging markets improved and their domestic and external financing 
situation continued to recover. However, beginning in early 2000, participants 
in mature and emerging markets have begun to manifest their loss of confidence. 
Signs of inflationary pressures in major currency areas emerged and the correction 
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of equity markets, especially in the technology sector took place. It appeared that 
investors became increasingly more risk averse, which led to increased volatility 
and a decline even in mature equity and bond markets. This in turn adversely 
affected emerging markets during 2000 (International Monetary Fund, 2000). 
This increased maxket volatility has re-emphasised the importance of forecast- 
ing capital flows which had been studied by Felstein and Horioka (1980) who had 
extended the Efe cycle model and incorporated inter-country differences in saving, 
investment and retirement to their analysis of capital flows. A surge in capital 
flows to a developing country may require important compensating policies by the 
domestic authorities in order to offset any adverse effects or potential reversibility 
of capital flows in the recipient economy (World Bank, 1997. Ch. 4) While a 
number of studies examine the history and of capital flows to developing coun- 
tries, attempts to model capital flows econometrically appear to be limited. In 
this connection, the focus of this chapter is on three types of capital flows (bond, 
equity and syndicated loans) to thirty-two developing countries, and forecasting 
capital flows to these countries. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we describe the data 
and the forecasting methodology of the fundamentals-based approach. We take 
into consideration the country specific or "pulr' factors that reflect domestic in- 
vestment opportunities and risks, as well as global or "push" factors that mirror 
econon& activity in developed countries which tend to affect the supply of in- 
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vestment funds towards emerging markets. A summary of the results of our 
forecasting exercise are also included in this section. Results of fundamentals- 
based forecasts under different scenarios are reported in section 3.3, and the final 
section 3.4 offers some concluding remaxks. 
3.2 Modelling and Forecasting Capital Flows to Emerging 
Markets: A Fundamentals-based Approach 
3.2.1 Data 
The data set used here comprises of monthly records of three types of capital 
flows (bond, equity and syndicated loan flows) to 32 developing countries in Latin 
America, Asia, Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union), the Middle 
East, and Africa. Specifically, bond flows include international bond issues by 
all (private, public and secondary) borrowers in the given country, excluding can- 
celled issues. These include eurobonds, global bonds and foreign bonds. Equity 
flows include international equity issues in the international capital markets by 
all borrowers in the given country. Publicly announced syndicated loans to all 
borrowers (public and private) are included in loan flows. The data are from Jan- 
uary 1990 to December 2000 at montWy frequency. The data on tMs research 
were obtained from the data bank of the World Bank, Development Economics 
Pýospects Group (DECPG). 
The 32 countries under study include Argentina, Brazil Columbia, Ecuador, 
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Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela for Latin America; China, In- 
dia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Thai- 
land and Turkey for Asia; Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine for 
Eastern Europe; Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco for the Middle 
East; and Cwneroon, Nigeria and South Africa for Africa. There are two sets of 
explanatory vaxiables: country-specific factors and global factors. For country- 
specific factors we use the consumer price index, the level of domestic credit, 
the short-term debt to reserves ratio, the level of industrial production, the do- 
mestic short-term interest rate, credit ratings, the reserves to import ratio and 
the domestic stock market index. Global or "pusY' factors taken into account 
in the model included global factors such as the strength of US output growth, 
US short-term and long-term interest rates, the Emerging Markets Bond Index 
(EMBI), the US swap rate and the US high yield spread (as proxies for a measure 
of risk aversion). More or less vaxiables can be used for this type of forecasting 
exercises. The variables incorporated in this study are those shown to have sta- 
tistically significant effect on capital flows to these developing countries using the 
Granger causality test, and/or are frequently analyzed by institutional investors 
and the World Bank in forecasting capital flows. 
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3.2.2 Fundamentals-based (Push versus Pull Factors) 
Approach 
We used an econometric forecasting model of emerging market capital inflows 
and related economic variables, using data from January 1990 up to December 
2000. This model is designed to capture the dynamic interactions between capital 
flows and the various factors determining their global supply and local demand. 
Capital flows to developing countries can be driven either by internal, country- 
specific factors, or external, global factors. Country-specific or "pull" factors axe 
those reflecting domestic investment opportunities and risks, which influence a 
pull on overseas funds, while global or "push" factors reflect a push on investment 
funds toward emerging markets. Push factors are designed to capture the level of 
economic activity and alternative investment opportunities in developed countries. 
The model was constructed first by estimating a long-run equilibrium rela- 
tionship between capital flows and the various push and pull factors, and then 
estimating a fiflly dynamic system in which changes in each of the variables con- 
sidered is a function of past movements in its own level, past movements in the 
other variables and the deviation from the long-run equilibrium. This "vector error 
correction7 system thus captures in a highly general way the underlying interplay 
of economic forces and relationships driving the various variables. Well-developed 
econometric techniques exist for estimating systems of this kind. 
By forecasting from the model and then feeding the forecasts back in, it is 
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possible to provide dynamic multi-step forecasts of all of the variables in the 
system. Alternatively, the model can be forecast subject to a set of assumptions 
or tscenarios' about the assumed future course of certain variables, to examine 
the likely impact of, say, a downturn in US economic activity on emerging market 
capital flows. 
The country-specific or pull factors considered include variables such as the 
consumer price index, the level of domestic credit, the short-term debt to re- 
serves ratio, the level of industrial production, the domestic short-term interest 
rate, credit ratings, the reserves to import ratio and the level of the domestic 
stock market index. It was found empirically that the level of bond, equity and 
syndicated loan flows into a country is affected by movements in these domestic 
puH factors, and at the same time capital flows can have a feedback influence on 
these variables, through the fWl dynamic interaction among flows and puU factors 
allowed for in the model. 
Global or "push! ' factors taken into account in the model include global factors 
such as the strength of US output growth, US short-term and long-term interest 
rates, the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBIl), the US swap rate and the US 
high yield bond spread (as proxies for a measure of risk aversion). Global factors 
influence capital inflows to emerging markets and emerging countries' macroeco- 
nomic variables. However, it is not likely that emerging countries' domestic factors 
would have any significant effect on global variables. Therefore, forecasts on push 
'EMBI yield spreads are measured by JP Morgan, and the index excludes Russia. 
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factors were derived separately by segmenting this part of the model, and were 
used as exogenous variables in forecasting capital flows to emerging markets. 
3.2.2.1 A Theoretic Framework 
Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (1996) have developed a useful analytical frarne- 
work that incorporates the effect of domestic and global factors on capital flows. 
They separate potential domestic causes into those operating at the project level 
and those which operate at the country level. Assuming capital flows may occur 
as transactions in different types of assets, indexed by s (s = 1,..., N), the domestic 
return on an asset of type s is decomposed into two components: a project ex- 
pected return (G. ) and an adjustment factor depending upon the creditworthiness 
of the country (C. ). The project return is asstuned to be a function of a vector 
of net flows (F) going to specific project types, while the creditworthiness factor 
is assumed to be a function of the vector of the end-of-period stocks of liabilities 
of all types, S: S= S-1 + F, where S-1 denotes the initial stodcs of liabilities. 
Given that external creditors will diversify their portfolios, the opportunity cost 
of assets of type s, V, is a function of S. Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (1996) 
then establish an axbitrage condition-from which F may be solved for - of the 
form 
0, (, q, F)C, (c, S-1 + F) = V(v, S-1 + F) 
6 
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where g, c and v represent shift factors associated, respectively, with the 
domestic economic environment and domestic creditworthiness (pull factors) and 
the financial conditions of the creditor country (push factors). G., C, and V. axe 
assumed to be increasing functions of g, c, and v respectively. The equilibrium 
or "desireT value of the vector of net flows F, F* say, determined implicitly by 
equation 3.1 may be expressed as 
F* (g, c, v, S-1) (3.2) 
where F* is increasing in g and c but decreasing in v and S-1. Holding S-1 
constant, totally differentiating equation 3.2, and approximating total derivatives 
by first differences yield: 
AF* = F, * A g+F2* A c+F3* Av (3.3) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Equation 3.3 describes the pat- 
tern of changes in desired capital flows, determined by changes in the pull factors 
g and c and the push factors v by the initial value of S. Increases in g and c and 
decreases in v may induce prolonged growth in capital flows to developing coun- 
tries. It states that differences in short-run and long-run capital movements might 
arise in accordance with the types of changes in g, c, and v: permanent changes 
in g, c, and v may cause long-run, permanent changes in the pattern of net flows, 
whereas transitory changes in these factors may generate transitory, short-term 
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changes in net flows, which may be reversed over time. For example, the grad- 
ual, permanent removal of capital controls and liberalization of restrictions of FDI 
may reduce the adjustment costs that foreign investors face in diversifying their 
portfolios and thus give rise to a gradual stock adjustment (flow) over time. This 
gradual adjustment also implies a complex dynamic pattern of net flows moving 
toward their long-run equilibrium value and is consistent with an estimation of 
capital flows. 
Dynamic adjustment can be formally introduced into the Fernandez-Arias- 
Montiel framework by assuming a simple cost-of-adjustment model. In this 
model factors such as market imperfections, informational asymmetries (Stightz 
and Weiss 1981), and entry and exit costs to emerging financial maxkets (Daveri, 
1995) are captured on the assumption that creditors face costs in adjusting their 
portfolios that axe increasing in the size of the adjustment. The desired vector of 
capital flows is given by equation 3.2. 
Assume that agents want to minimize the difference between desired and ac- 
tual flows, subject to adjustment costs. A simple way of modelling this is to 
assume a simple quadratic loss function for investors: 
L= (F - F*)'M, (F - F*) + (F - F-1)'M2(F - F-1) (3.4) 
where M, and M2 are positive definite weighting matrices. Rom the first- 
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order conditions for minimizing L, we can derive a simple equation for changes in 
F: 
AF = (Mi + M2)-'Ml(F* - F-, ) (3.5) 
wMch, rearranging and using equation 3.3, can be equivalently expressed in 
the error-correction form: 
AF = AO(F* -F)-, +A, A g+A2 A c+A3 Av (3.6) 
where Ao = (Ml + M2)-'Ml and Ai = (Ml + M2)-'MFi*, (i = 1,2,3). 
According to equation 3.6 changes in current capital flows are determined 
partly by the difference between desired and actual capital flows in the previous 
period and partly by the changes in the factors determining the desired level of 
capital flows. Again, changes in push and pull factors can be decomposed into 
permanent and transitory components, with only the permanent ones affecting 
the long-run level of F. 'kansitory movements, which are also reversed over time, 
will generate transitory movements in F, which are also reversed over time,. For 
example, a temporaxy reduction in U. S. interest rates, which n-dght be interpreted 
as a downward movement in v, will, other things being equal, generate a rise in 
capital flows to the developing country equal to A3 AV (which is positive since F* 
is decreasing in v and niv is negative). If this change persists over time, then the 
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long-run level of F will be raised because of the permanent effect on F* operating 
through 3.2. If on the other hand, the change in v is reversed over subsequent 
periods, then although AF will be affected over several periods, the net long-run 
effect on both desired and actual capital flows will be zero. 
3.2-2.1 An Empirical Framework 
Consider a panel of N countries, indexed by i (i=1,... 'N), with portfolio flows 
at time t denoted fit , assumed to be an integrated process of order one I(l) Also, 
define a vector of country-specific factors as xit and a vector of global factors as 
wit and assume that both vectors contain at least one I(1) variable and no higher 
order integrated cointegrating relationships of the kind: 
fit = Plxit + -ylwit + eit, i=1, ... N 
(3.7) 
where fit may be either eqUity flows, say efit, or bond flows, say bfit. 
If cointegration is established in above equation, that is, the error term eit is 
approximately stationary, then the I(1) variables in xit and wit may be thought 
of as capturing the long-run or permanent component of fit, whereas eit captures 
short-run or temporary movements of capital flows. Since eit may alternatively be 
interpreted as the deviation from the long-run equilibrium (eit = fit - O'xit -y 
wit), it may be used in an analysis of the short-run dynamics of capital flows 
tbrough estimation of the error correction model (ECM): 
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pp 
fit = oi-p(plx--ylw)it+o A fit-j+Ex, j A xit-, +E 61, j A wit-, +wit, i= jl... N 13 11 
j=o j=o 
(3.8) 
where i is a country index, ? Pi is a constant term, j(=o,..., p) denotes the 
number of lags and wit is approximately white noise. Equation 3.8 is a panel 
data generalization of the error-correction representation of cointegrated. variables 
established by Engle and Granger (1987) and f6flow directly from the Granger 
Representation Theorem (Granger, 1983; Engle and Granger, 1987). 
The adoption of an error correction system, employed in other dynamic mod- 
elling contexts in international finance, allows us to shed some light on the dy- 
namic versus long-run determination of bond and equity flows and differentiates 
the present study from the earlier studies on portfolio flows determination. Equa- 
tions 3.8 provide the fuH dynamic interaction of the determinants of capital flows. 
Models of bond, equity and syndicated loan flows to developing countries have 
been estimated and used as a forecasting framework. 
3.2.3 An Intuitive Interpretation 
If over the same period we find that capital flows do not tend to settle at 
any particular level-that is, they are nonstationary-then at least some of their 
determinants must also be nonstationary. Thus if we believe that flows to country 
fit , are affected 
by a vector of pull factors xit and a vector of push factors wit, 
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then we would expect to find a relationsl-dp of the form written in equation 3.7. 
Thus rapid changes in flows are determined by rapid changes in some of the push 
or some of the pull factors, or both. It is possible, however, that some of the 
push and pull factors are relatively stable over the sample period but still enter 
into equation 3.7. 
Given that eit is expected to be highly stable over time, equation 3.7 can be 
interpreted as a long-run relationship because, on average, we would expect to 
find fit = P'xit + -t' wit, termed a 'cointegrating relationship'. If we assume that 
actual and desired capital flows coincide in the long run, then we can think of 
the cointegrating relationship as determining the desired level of capital flows: 
fit = O'Xit +Y Wit. Under this interpretation equation 3.7 is the empirical 
analog of the theoretical equation 3.2. Hence the error term eit can be thought as 
the difference between desired and actual flows, eit = fit - fi*t. This suggests that, 
having estimated the long-run parameters 6 and -y, we can then estimate an error- 
correction model (equation 3.6), in which changes in flows axe a function of changes 
in the variables determining the desired level of flows-that is, changes in xit and 
wit-as well as of the error-correction term itself, eit. In fact, econometric theory 
shows that if a cointegrating relationship exists, then such an error-correction 
model must also exist. Estimating the dynamic error-correction form then allows 
us to determine which factors are important in determining short-run movements 
in capital flows. 
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One of the most important features of this research involves the interaction of 
pull factors and push factors with the movements of capital flows. It was found 
empirically that the level of bond, equity and syndicated loan flows into a country 
is affected by movements in the domestic pifll factors, and at the same time capital 
flows can have a feedback influence on these variables, through the full dynamic 
interaction among flows and pull factors allowed for in the model. This research 
allows for causal interactions between capital inflows and domestic factors that 
influence such inflows. However, it is not likely that emerging countries' domestic 
factors would have any significant effect on global variables. Therefore, forecasts 
of push factors were derived separately by segmenting this part of the model, and 
were used as exogenous variables in forecasting capital flows to emerging markets. 
That is, global factors are forecast independently using the Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) analysis and their evolution influences capital flows into a country but the 
capital flows of an individual country are not allowed to influence the forecast of 
the global factors. With respect to global factors, the projections suggest, inter 
alla, that (i) the level of the EMBI will decline gradually to around 600 until 
end 2003, (ii) the US high yield spread will remain stable at about 890 from end 
2000 until end 2003, (iii) US industrial production will grow at annual rate of 3-4 
percent over the forecast period after a slight slowdown to about 2-3 percent in 
early 2001, (iv) the US short-term interest rate will decline to around 4 percent 
and (v) the spread between US long-term and short-term interest rates will narrow 
52 
to less than 300 basis points by end 2003. The summary of forecast results of 
capital flows to developing countries are reported in the tables in appendix. 
3.2.4 A Dynamic Analysis of Portfolio Flows 
The existence of at least one cointegrating relationship between a set of vari- 
ables implies that an error-correction model exists, because, as established by 
the Granger representation theorem, for any set of I(1) variables error-correction 
and cointegration are equivalent representations. Therefore, the residuals from 
the equilibrium regressions (equation 3.7) can be used to estimate, by generalized 
least squaxes, the error-correction models (equation 3.8) as seemingly unrelated 
regessions. 
We adopt the conventional general-to-specific procedure to estimate a parsi- 
momous error-correction model, as suggested by Davidson et al. (1978) and Hendry 
(1983). The resulting models appeared to be most adequate in terms of high 
coefficients of determination and residuals that axe approximately white noise, 
although some level of trade-off is recognized as maximizing the coefficient of 
determination entails the issue of the parsimony in this type of exercise. The 
forecasting equation estimated for the bond flows to China is as Mows. 
A(BCHI) = 0.2406545418 *A(BCHI(-J)) + 0.09199948254 * A(BCHI(-2)) 
-37.34598359 * A(CCP(-l)) + 23.69301456 * A(CCP(-2)) 
+8.226456453e - 06 * A(CCR(-l)) - 1.658656282e - 05 * A(CCR( 
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1647.636043 *, L(CDBT(-l)) + 1025.190626 *A(CDBT( 
-2)) + 1.733384267 *, L(CIP(-l)) + 7.330162138 * A(CIP(-2)) 
-38.99001526 * A(CR(-l)) + 4.722712586 * A(CR(-2)) 
-105.1366126 *A(CRAT(-1)) + 124.3883053 * A(CRAT( 
-2)) + 6.22011192 *A(CREI(-1)) - 18-89486172 * A(CREI( 
1.5443ý8858 *A(CST(-1)) + 0.7325700175 *A(CST( 
311.8289697 - 1.113033808 * BCHI(-l) + 13.33327477 * CCP 
(-l) - 1.05068757le - 05 * CCR(-l) + 1064.566858 * CDBT( 
-1) + 3.563658884 * CIP(-l) + 51.26336276 * CR(-l) 
+0.9858804968 * CST(-l) + 0.1432157755 * A(EM) 
-31.53754998 * CRAT(-l) - 36.70238669 * CREI(-l) 
-1.814269761 * A(HY) + 29.39658789 * A(IP) + 4.983821677 * A(SW 
-90.13338044 *A(Ul) + 100.2563022 *A(U10) (3.9) 
where BCHI denotes bond flow for China, CCP the CPI of China, CDBT 
the ratio of short term debt to foreign reserves of China, CIP the industrial 
production, CR the short term interest rate of China, CRAT the credit rating of 
China, CREI the ratio of reserve over import, and the CST the stock price index 
of China. The first letter of each pull variable represents the country, i. e. 'C' for 
China. Global (or push) variables are EM for Emerging Market Bond Index yield 
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spread, HY for US Mgh yield bond spread, IP for US industrial production, SW 
for US swap rate, Ul for US short-term interest rate and U10 for U. S. long-term 
interest rate. 
3.2.5 Forecast Results 
Gross private capital flows to emerging markets increased substantially by 
. -bout 37.6 percent from, 1999 to 2000. This increased level is equivalent to about 
76.5 percent of the inflows of 1997. The largest increase was observed in equity 
flows, which rose in 2000 by about 75 percent compared to the previous year. 
Bond and loan flows also took an upturn, with increases of about 13 percent and 
49 percent respectively by end 2000. The model projects total flows to increase by 
about 6.9 percent, 9.9 percent and 4 percent in 2001,2002 and 2003 respectively, 
over the previous year. (See the tables at the end of this chapter) 
Global factors driving this forecast increase appear to include a slight slow 
down in the performance of the US economy combined with declines in US interest 
rates coupled with the moderation in the Emerging Market Bond Index since its 
recovery in late 2000. 
On the domestic side, forecast increases in capital flows from the model were 
usually associated with forecasts of increasing credit ratings and stock prices, 
and stable or declining short-term debt-reserve ratios. Such countries were also 
typically forecast to experience stable or moderately rising consumer prices. A 
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strong forecast upsurge in the CPI is associated with declining capital inflow 
forecasts. The level of domestic credit and domestic industrial production show 
mixed signals, although the majority of countries with increasing inflow forecasts 
also have increasing domestic credit and industrial production forecasts. The 
economic intuition seems clear: higher inflows result in an accumulation of reserves 
and a rise in stock prices, a restoration of market confidence and an upwaxd 
revision of credit rating which induces further capital inflows into the country. 
Among the three types of capital flows, equity flows to developing countries 
showed the largest increase. A possible reason why the model forecasts such 
strong performance in equity flows is that, compared to bond and loan flows, 
equity flows in the past have generally been extremely low and probably below 
the equilibrium level. Thus, the forecast surge in this category of flows may 
represent a degree of catch-up. Even with the increase of 75% in equity flows 
for 2000, equity flows would still only account for around 15-20 percent of overall 
capital flows to emerging markets. 
The rapid growth in aggregate private capital flows to emerging markets was 
expected to slow down in 2001 according to the forecast, due largely to a forecast 
sluggish performance of the EMBI, together with improvements in the reserves 
to short term debt ratio and the availability of domestic credit in a number of 
emerging markets. In Asia, after a hike of 63% in 2000, total inflows axe expected 
to decline by about 3% in 2001 due to drops in bond and loan flows to the region. 
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The growth in inflow is expected to pick up again in 2002 to 2003. A continued 
buoyant inflow of funds is anticipated for China. 
Latin America also recorded a substantial rise in capital flows during 2000. 
The recovery was especially evident in the amount of equity flows which began 
to happen in 1999. In 2000, total equity inflow to Latin American emerging 
countries reached US$6.8 bn, from US$761 mn in 1999, due to huge inflows to 
Brazil and Mexico during second half of 2000. Total private capital inflows to 
the region increased by 19% in 2000, and are forecast to maintain strong growth 
in 2001 by an increase of 23%. However, the growth rate is expected to decline, 
with an increase of 9% in 2002 followed by a decrease of 5% for 2003. Brazil 
anticipates a stable growth in inflows while inflows to Mexico are expected to 
moderate throughout 2002-2003. Inflows to Argentina axe forecast to recover, 
however, a number of countries in Latin America are likely to have limited access 
to capital markets in the next few years. 
Changes in flows to Eastern Europe are dominated by Russia, and the total 
flow to the rest of the countries in Eastern Europe is expected to decrease by 
about 21% in 2001 after a hike of 29% in 2000. The growth in loan inflows was 
exceptionally high in 2000, but these are forecast to decline in 2002 and 2003. 
The ratio of equity inflows to total private inflows is especially low in this region 
compared to the rest of the world. 
Inflows to Africa (heavily dominated by South Africa) grew rapidly in 2000 
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by 59% compared to 1999. This was due to over 300% growth in loan inflows 
despite drops in bond and equity flows. The level of inflow is projected to decline 
by about 5% during 2001, but growth is expected to pick up again in 2002-2003. 
South Africa has been experiencing a steady but increasing growth trend in capital 
. --n inflows, and most of its domestic pull factors continue to look favourable over the 
next three years, which is forecast to generate a continuous inflow of capital to 
the country. 
3.3 Capital Flow Forecasts Under Different Scenarios 
Capital inflows to developing countries were forecast under two different types 
of low case scenarios: the partial derivative approach and integrated approach. 
The partial derivative approach examines capital flow forecasts under a negative 
shodc to one global variable for 12 months while holding other global variables 
fixed. The second type of low case scenarios, the integrated approach, allows for 
the negative shock in one global variable to affect other global variables. 
3.3.1 Partial Derivative Approach of Low Case Scenario 
In this exercise, we allowed for the negative shocks to one of the global vari- 
ables to continue for 12 months, from July 2001 to June 2002. Negative shocks 
include (i) a rise in the US high yield bond spread by 60 basis points, (ii) zero 
percentage growth in US industrial production, (iii) an increase of 30 basis points 
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in the swap rate, (iv) a 2% rise in the US short-term interest rate and (v) combi- 
nation of all of above. Except for the last scenario, each scenario was tested while 
holding all other global vaxiables unchanged from the original scenaxio, thus con- 
veying the ideal of partial derivative. The results of capital forecasts under low 
case scenarios are compared with original forecasts in the table in the appendix 
to this chapter. 
Generally, shocks to global financial variables, including those to the US high 
yield bond spread, swap rates and to US interest rates, caused a slight deviation 
of total capital flow forecasts from their original trends. However, flows soon 
began to revert to their original values. Although no countries reacted identically 
to the shocks, in the case of 2% increase in the US short-term interest rate, the 
initial declines in capital inflows were mostly linked with decreases in the level of 
domestic credit, domestic industrial production, and stock prices. In particular, 
credit ratings declined for most of the developing countries under study. The 
level of domestic short term interest rates showed mixed signals. A possible 
explanation for the recovery of capital inflows could be that countries experiencing 
higher domestic interest rates can attract foreign capital more easily. Countries 
that experience lower interest rates are faced with lesser debt burden which can 
spur domestic economic activity, leading to an improvement in credit ratings. 
These factors may then generate a resumed inflow of foreign capital, which leads 
to an accumulation of reserves, attracting further inflows. 
59 
However, in the case of shocks to global real factors, such as in the scenario 
with zero growth in US industrial production, the effects were quite different. 
Flows to most emerging markets dropped substantially, and continued to decline 
without sign of recovery, resulting as low as 10% less compared with the original 
scenario for Asia. The main reason for this appears to be due to the severe 
negative real impact on emerging markets who rely on the US (and developed 
countries in general) as a prime export destination. Also, developing countries 
import parts and intermediate goods from the US to produce final goods for 
re-export, and the activity of this sector would also be damaged by a marked 
slowdown in US activity, generating further negative multiplier effects. 
The capital flow forecasts under low case scenarios axe summarized in the 
tables below for both partial derivative and for the integrated approach. In 
the appendix, we include a graphical presentation of capital flow projections for 
selected emerging markets. Graphs showing the changes in the pull factors under 
the partial derivative approach are also included in the appendix. 
3.3.2 Integrated Approach of Worst Case Scenario 
Low case scenarios were tested, this time allowing for the simultaneous inter- 
action among global variables for the same 12 months period. The scenarios were, 
a rise in the US high yield bond spread by 60 basis points, (ii) an increase of 30 
basis points in the US swap rate, and (iii) a 2% rise in the US short-term interest 
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rate. Each of these shocks would affect the rest of the global vaxiables, i. e. EMBI, 
US high yield bond spread, US industrial production, US swap rate and US inter- 
est rates. Hence, three sets of newly integrated global factors were produced for 
the scenarios and used to forecast future capital inflows to the emerging markets. 
A shock to the US high yield bond spread by 60 basis points led to relatively 
significant decreases in the EMBI and in US industrial production, and an increase 
in the US swap rate. US interest rates declined slightly. Although the EMBI 
is positively related to changes in the US high yield bond spread, its correlation 
with changes in the Nasdaq index has increased significantly in recent years (IMF 
2000). Hence it may be possible for the EMBI to decline while the US high yield 
bond index increases. An increase in the US swap rate of 30 basis points yielded 
only minor changes to the rest of the global vaxiables, while a 2% increase in US 
short term interest rates led to a hike in the EMBI as well as increases in most of 
the global variables and a decrease in US industrial production. 
Capital flows to Latin America were most sensitive to US interest rates, and 
they declined by a maximum of U$600mn in a month, or U$3,700 mn in a year 
(about 8% of total flows to the region). Asia was also heavily effected by changes 
in the US interest rate, but was more susceptible to the shock in the US high 
yield spread, as it resulted in a maximum of a 10.4% reduction of inflows to the 
region. Flows to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union countries were also 
significantly affected by the shock in US interest rates and in the US high yield 
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spread. However, flows to the Middle Eastern countries were mostly indifferent to 
the changes in global factors except for the shock in the US interest rate. Finally, a 
projection of flows to Africa, dominated by South Africa, was in general, relatively 
unaffected by any of above scenarios. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this research we have examined the determinants of foreign capital inflows to 
32 developing countries and provided forecasts of capital inflows for 2001 through 
2003, extending previous work by Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1993) and 
Taylor and Sarno (1999a, 1999b). Specifically, we investigated the relationship of 
push and pull factors on three types of capital flows (bond, equity and syndicated 
loans) to developing countries, and forecast future flows based on this relationsWp. 
We considered in our set of country-specific factors the consumer price index, 
the level of domestic credit, the short-term debt to reserves ratio, the level of 
industrial production, the domestic short-term interest rate, credit rating, the 
reserves to import ratio and the level of the domestic stock market index. Global 
or "push" factors taken into account in the model included global factors such as 
the strength of US output growth, US short-term and long-term interest rates, the 
Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI), the US swap rate and the US high yield 
spread (as proxies for a measure of risk aversion). The forecasting model uses 
a vector autoregressive framework. The technique allows for causal interactions 
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between capital inflows and domestic factors that influence such inflows. Global 
factors are forecast independently and their evolution influences capital flows into 
a country but the capital flows of an individual country are not allowed to influence 
the forecast of the global factors. We examined the determinants of portfolio flows 
by employing cointegration, techniques. The results of individual country forecasts 
are included in the appendix. 
Moreover, we also provided forecasts of capital flows to developing countries 
projected under different low case scenarios, both from a partial derivative ap- 
proach and from an integrated approach. Under the partial derivative approach, 
shocks to global financial variables, including the US high yield, swap rate and 
US interest rates, caused an inunediate drop in inflows, but flows begin to recover 
after 6-8 months and to resume the original trend. Under the shock to global real 
factors, such as in the scenario with zero growth in US industrial production, the 
flows to emerging maikets dropped substantially, and continued to decline with- 
out any signs of recovery. For the integrated low case scenario approach, changes 
in US interest rates had the most significant effect on capital flows to most of the 
emerging markets. 
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Figure 3.1 -China 1 
Figure 3: Capital Flow Forecasts under Low Case Scenarios for 
Selected Countries 
China 
Fig 3.1.1 Partial Derivatives Approach 
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Above series indicate the forecast differences between the original and various low case scenarios. 
For example "total-h-total-fcst" represent the forecast difference between the original (total - 
fcst) and 
the forecast under 60 b. p. higher US high yield bond spread (total_h) from July 2001 to June 2002. 
The variables total_i, total_s, total_u, total -c represent 
forecast under flat US industrial production, 30b. p. 
higher swap rate, 2% increasease US interest rate and the combination of all low case senarios 
Fig 3.1.2 Integrated Approach 
Difference in Capital Flow Forecasts(US$ mn) 
400 
300 
200 
loo 
o 
- 100 
-200 
-300 
-400 
\L 
total_hi-total-fcst 
-total_si-total_fcst 
total_ui-total_fcs_t 
Above series indicate the forecast differences between the original and integrated low case scenarios. 
'T' in "total-hi-total--cast" signifies that the series are forecasts under ingetrated low case scenarios. 
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3.1.3 Changes in the Pull Factors under Partial Derivative Approach of 
Low Case Scenario 
Fig 3.1.3 (a) 2% Increase in the US short-term interest rate 
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reservelimport ratio and stock price index respectively. 
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Fig 3.1.3 (b) 0% Growth in the US Industrial Production 
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Korea 
Fig 3.2.1 Partial Derivatives Approach 
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Above series indicate the forecast differences between the original and various low case scenarios. 
For example "total - 
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fcst" represent the forecast difference between the original forecast (total-fCst) and 
the forecast under 60 b. p. higher US high yield bond spread (total_h) from July 2001 to June 2002. 
The variables total - 
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s, total_u, total_c represent forecast under flat US industrial production, 30b. p. 
higher swap rate, 2% increasease US interest rate and the combination of all low case senarios 
Fig 3.2.2 Integrated Approach 
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3.2.3 Changes in the Pull Factors under Partial Derivative Approach of 
Low Case Scenarios 
Fig 3.2.3 (a) 2% Increase in the US short-term interest rate 
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The first letter of series represents the country, and the rest represent domestic pull factors. 
For example, CP, CR, DBT, IP, R, RAT, REI and ST represent CPI, domestic credit, short- 
term debt/reserve ratio, industrial production, short-term domestic interest rate, credit rating, 
reserve/import ratio and stock price index respectively. 
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Fig 3.2.3 (b) 0% Growth in the US Industrial Production 
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South Africa 
Fig 3.3.1 Partial Derivatives Approach 
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Fig 3.3.2 Integrated Approach 
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3.3.3 Changes in the Pull Factors under Partial Derivative Approach of 
Low Case Scenarios 
Fig 3.3.3 (a) 2% Increase in the US short-term interest rate 
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The first letter of series represents the country, and the rest represent domestic pull factors. 
For example, CP, CR, DBT, IP, R, RAT, REI and ST represent CPI, domestic credit, short- 
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reserve/import ratio and stock price index respectively. 
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Fig 3.3.3 (b) 0% Growth in the US Industrial Production 
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Venezuela 
Fig 3.4.1 Partial Derivatives Approach 
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Above series indicate the forecast differences between the original and various low case scenarios. 
For example "total-h-total-fcst" represent the forecast difference between the original (total_fcst) and 
the forecast under 60 b. p. higher US high yield bond spread (total_h) from July 2001 to June 2002. 
The variables total_i, total_s, total-u, totat_c represent forecast under flat US industrial production, 30b. p. 
higher swap rate, 2% increasease US interest rate and the combination of all low case senarios 
Fig 3.4.2 Integrated Approach 
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Above series indicate differences between the original forecasts and the forecasts under integrated 
low case scenarios. 
For example, 'T' in "total-hi-total-cast" signifies that the series are forecasts under ingetrated low case 
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3.4.3 Changes in the Pull Factors under Partial Derivative Approach of 
Low Case Scenarios 
Fig 3.4.3 (a) 2% Increase in the US short-term interest rate 
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The first letter of series represents the country, and the rest represent domestic pull factors. 
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Fig 3.4.3 (b) 0% Growth in the US Industrial Production 
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Chapter 4 
Capital Flow Forecasts :A Time 
Series Approach 
4.1 Introduction 
4ý In this chapter, we provide capital flow forecasts to developing countries using 
a pure, Kalman ffitering time-series approach. Using the same sets of data as the 
previous chapter and extending the work of Sarno and Taylor(1999 a, b) on the 
analysis of temporary and permanent components of international capital flows, 
we develop and estimate statistical models of capital flows to a wide range of 
emerging markets. In particiflar, we employ the Kalman filter (Harvey 1989) in 
order to separate out permanent and temporary components from time series for 
flows of bond, equity and syndicated loans to 32 emerging markets. Based on 
these models, and using monthly data up to December 2000, forecasts of various 
capital flows are presented for the period January 2001 to December 2003. The 
results of the time series based forecasts are then compared with those obtained 
using a fundamentals-based approach. 
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4.2 Modelling and Forecasting Capital Flows to 
Developing Countries : Time Series Approach 
4.2.1 Time Series Approach 
Papers such as Claessens et al. (1995) and Saxno and Taylor (1999a, b) have 
taken a time series approadi by estimating statistical models of capital flows that 
are designed to capture the intrinsic characteristics of series for various categories 
of capital flows to developing countries without explicit reference to underlying 
economic determinants. The essential idea is to break the time series down 
into unobserved permanent and temporary components using maximum likelihood 
0. Kalman filtering methods. Consider a panel data set of N countries with capital 
flows of a certain category for the ith country at time t, generically denoted fit. 
The unobserved components model may be written 
fit = flit + vit + cit, i=1, ..., N; t=1, ..., 
where fit may be any of the capital-account items such as bond, equity or loan 
flows, and pit is a trend component, the irregulax component. Eit is approximately 
normally independently distributed with zero mean and constant variance, and 
vit represents a first-order autoregressive, AR(J) component: 
Vit = Pvivit-l (4.2) 
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where ýjt is approximately normally independently distributed with zero mean 
and constant variance, and the autoregressive coefficient is constrained to be less 
than unity in absolute value in order to ensure stationarity of the component. 
The stochastic trend component is modelled as: 
pit ý Pit-l + pit-1 - ? lit (4.3) 
and 
flit 
-, -,: P)3ioit-1 + 
(it (4.4) 
where Pit represents the slope of gradient of the trend component pit and 
poi represents the damping factor, while each of the disturbances 71it and (it is 
assumed to be approximately normally independently distributed with zero mean 
and constant variance. 
The irregular component, eit, the level disturbance qit and the slope distur- 
bance (it are mutually uncorrelated. The slope component may be treated as 
fixed rather than stochastic and also be excluded from the trend specification 
when this is appropriate. 
Intuitively, the above equations express the capital flow as the sum of a perma- 
nent component (tijt), a Purely temporary and zero persistence component (Eit), 
and a more slowly decaying temporary component (vit). In addition, the drift in 
the random walk component (flit) may itself vary over time. Thus the model sep- 
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arates out the persistent and temporary components of the data in a very general, 
comprehensive and intuitive fashion. 
It should be clear that the unobservable components model is 'non-standard' 
in the sense that one cannot apply least squares estimation directly to the above 
equations. The statistical treatment of the unobserved components model out- 
lined above may be conveniently handled, however, by writing it in state space 
form, involving a measurement equation relating the unobserved components (the 
state vector) to an observed series, together with a transition equation govern- 
ing the evolution of the state vector. The state-space paxameters can then be 
estimated by maximum likelihood Kalman filtering methods (Harvey, 1989; Cuth- 
bertson et al., 1992). The estimated hyperparameters (i. e. the variance param- 
eters) indicate the relative contribution of each component in the state vector to 
explaining the total vaxiation in the time series under consideration. In some 
sense, therefore, the estimated variances allow us - by providing information on 
the size of the nonstationary and the stationary components in the series - to 
quantify the degree of persistence of the series in question. 
The modelling and forecasting procedures axe essentially a general-to-specific 
procedure where we start from the most general unobserved components model 
equations 4.1 - 4.4 and test down by imposing exclusion restrictions on the pa- 
rameters found to be statistically insignificant at conventional nominal levels of 
significance. In choosing the most appropriate model for each country's bond', 
'International bond issues by all (private, public and secondary) borrowers in the given 
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equity2 and syndicated loan' flows, we rely on the coefficient of determination 
and on the Akaike information criterion (Harvey, 1989, pp 263-270). Based on 
the chosen model, out-of-sample forecasts are derived for periods up to Decem- 
ber 2003. In Table 4.1, we classify the various model specifications which were 
selected for capital flows to our set of developing countries on the basis of the 
goodness of fit criteria discussed above. In Tables 4.2 - 4.4, we report the results 
of estimating the most appropriate structural time series model in state space 
form by Kalman filter maximum likelihood methods for each of the capital in- 
flows series examined. In the second and third columns of these tables we report 
details of the unobserved components included in the estimated structural time 
series model. In the fourth column we report the estimated standard devia- 
tions; of the disturbances of the stochastic components included in the state and 
in parentheses we report the Q-ratios-i. e. the ratios of each estimated standard 
deviation to the largest standard deviation across components-for each model, 
which indicates the relative statistical importance of the components. In the last 
three columns we report the estimated AR(I) coefficient (the damping factor p,, 
), which provides evidence on the degree of persistence of the stationary AR(l) 
component of the model, the coefficient of determination (which can be regarded 
as quite high for all of the estimated models), and the p-value from Ljung-Box 
country, excluding cancelled issues. These include eurobonds, global bonds and foreign bonds 21nternational equity issues in the international capital markets by all borrowers in the given 
country. 3Publicly announced syndicated loans to all borrowers (public and private). 
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test statistics of the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals. In Table 
4.5, the results of time series based approach forecasts axe summarised for bond, 
equity and syndicated loan flows to 32 developing countries. 
Table 4.1: Restricted structural time-series models adopted in modelling 
capital flows 
Model 1: Stochastic 
'level 
(fixed slope) + AR(1) + irregular component 
[a 2= 0] C 
/-It + vt + ft 
At : -- pt-I + io + 77t 
Vt = Pvvt-l +&I Pv l< 1 
Model 2: Stochastic level (no slope) + AR(1) + irregular component 
1U2 = 0, pp = c 
ft = pt + vt + et 
ttt ---: - tlt-l 
+ 71t 
Vt = Pvvt-l + ýt I P, l< 1 
Model 3: Stochastic level (no slope) + AR(1) 
[a 2=0, PO = 0, a2= CC 
ft = ILt + vt 
Pt ý-- I-It-l + 77t 
vt =. pvvt-i +&IP, l< 1 
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Model 4: Stochastic level (no slope) + irregular component 
u3 (= 07 pß = 01 0,2 = (), pv = 16 
W.. 
ILt + vt + Et 
At ý I-It-1 + 77t 
Or2 = 01 Model 5: Stochastic level (fixed slope) + AR(1)[o-2C = 0, c 
ft = pt + vt + et 
At - Ilt-1 +0 ? It 
Vt = P,, Vt-i +&IP, l< 1 
Model 6: Stochastic level (fixed slope) + irregular component 
0, or2 =07 p" = 01 101c 4 
ft = At + Vt + ft 
[It : -- I-It-1 + )3 + 77t 
4.2.2 Estimation Results 
Tables 4.2 - 4.4, show that for all countries, the largest variance of the distur- 
bance is always one of the stationary components in the state vector, either in the 
irregular or the AR(1) component. For Korean bond flows, for example, model 3 
was arrived at after our general-to-specific approach. This is a structural model 
of the form: ft = fit + vt with pt = ILt-, + 77t, and vt = p,, vt-l + ýt, I p,, j< 1 so 
that bond flows to Korea axe seen to have both a permanent component (pt) and 
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AR(l) component (vt). The standard deviation of the AR(l) component (a, ) is 
more than five times the standard deviation of the innovation to the permanent 
component (a,, ), indicating the dominance of the more temporary component 
over the permanent component in explaining the variation of flows. In Table 4.2, 
this shows up as a Q-ratio, for the AR(l) component. of 1.0 (since it is the largest 
component) and a Q-ratio, for the permanent component (or level) of 0.183. This 
indicates that although there is a permanent component in Korean bond inflows, 
it is dominated by a more temporary, AR(l) component. In 75-80% of the flows, 
the largest parwneter is the variance of the disturbance of the irregular compo- 
nent which has no persistence at all. (Model 4 or Model 6) In the remainder of the 
cases, such as bond flows to Korea as indicated above, the AR(l) parameter has 
the largest variance, which implies some slight degree of persistence The Q-ratios 
for the stochastic level (pt) are very low, suggesting that the contribution of the 
nonstationary, more persistent, component in explaining the variance of equity 
and bond flows is extremely low, whereas more temporary components (such as 
vt and ýt) are, by contrast, very large. Nevertheless, the stochastic levels are 
always found to be statistically significantly different from zero at conventional 
norninal levels of significance, as implied by the estimated coefficients of the final 
state vector and the corresponding root mean square errors for the nonstationary 
stochastic component included in the estimated model. 
The results from estimating the unobserved components model for bond, eq- 
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uity and syndicated loan flows to developing countries suggest that a statistically 
significant nonstationary permanent component is present in the data, but that 
this is generally very small in size, contributing very little to explaining variation 
in the series. Hence, one can visualise the capital flows as a long tube composed 
of two types of unobservable components, first the thin, thread-like permanent 
component in the centre, surrounded and covered by thick layers of temporary 
components that determine the magnitude (or thickness of the tube) and direc- 
tion of capital flows. Countries that had received relatively large flows in the 
previous years were able to record such inflows due to the active temporary com- 
ponents in the flows. Inflows to these countries are expected to remain high if the 
temporary components continue to exert huge, positive effects. 
4.3 Comparison of Capital Flow Forecasts : Time Series 
versus Fundamentals-based Approach 
Sununaries of the capital flow forecasts to developing countries are reported 
in Table 4.5. The results of capital flow analysis discussed above suggest that 
bond, equity and loan flows are characterized by a statistically significant but 
very small permanent components, and therefore axe potentially susceptible to 
reversals (Sarno and Taylor, 1999a). Indeed, during the first year of the forecast, 
negative growth in capital inflows to emerging markets is anticipated. The Table 
4.5 compares the capital flow forecast results under the time series and fundamen- 
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tals based (see chapter 3) approaches for the period 2001-2003. It is shown that 
forecasts of total capital flows to emerging markets under the time series approach 
is lower than that under the fundmentals based approach. Especially during the 
first year of the forecast, the time series based model projects a reversal of capital 
flows by -6%, where as the fundamentals based model projects continued growth 
of inflows by 14% into the region. This is laxgely due to the forecast differences in 
Latin America which comprise 38% of total capital flows to 32 emerging markets. 
Specifically, time series model predicts -6% growth in total capital inflows to Latin 
America whereas fundamental based model projects 23% increase in capital in- 
flows. The time series model also produces lower flow forecasts for Asia, Eastern 
Europe, and Africa compared with the fundamental based model. For example, 
equity flows to Korea was projected at -13% growth in 2001 under the time series 
approach, whereas the fundamental based model predicted 7% increase. How- 
ever, the relative percentage of inflows into eadi region over total capital inflows 
remain at similar level compared with 2000; 38% of total capital flows for Latin 
America, 51% for Asia, 3% for Eastern Europe, 2% for the Nfiddle East and 5% 
for Africa. Total capital inflows are anticipated to resume to year 2000 level by 
2003. 
Note that the fundwnentals-based approach, on the other hand, forecasts 
capital flows to emerging markets under the scenario that the US economy will 
experience a soft landing in 2001 to 2003. That is, the fundamental based forecasts 
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assume a slight slow down in the performance of the US economy (3-4% growth 
in the US. industrial production), combined with declines in US interest rates 
and moderation in the Emerging Market Bond Index. In our previous chapter, 
we conducted capital flow forecasts under the partial derivative approach of low 
case scenarios. The results of this exercise indicated that shocks to global financial 
variables had only minor effects, but a shock to a global real variable (0% growth in 
the US. industrial production) resulted in a substantial decline in capital inflows to 
emerging markets. The forecast results under the time series approach axe indeed 
very similar to the fundamentals-based approach under the low case scenario of 0% 
US industrial production growth. The former projects -6% growth, where as the 
latter predicts -5.2% growth in 2001. The fundamentals-based approach forecast 
with 0% US industrial production and 2% lower US short term interest rate gave 
similar results. Therefore, the positive projection of capital flows under the 
fundamentals-based approach compared to that under the time series approach 
can partiaUy be attributed to the assumption of continued growth in the US 
economy which helps emerging markets export growth and maintain the confidence 
necessary to continue capital attraction. This coincides with the results that the 
largest gap in forecast difference was in Latin America and in Asia for whom the 
US serves as their major export market. 
The major difference between the ]Kalman filtering time series-based approach 
and the pull versus push fundamentals-based approach is that the former involves 
74 
the evolution of unobserved variables. The time series approach of capital flow 
forecasting incorporates both permanent and temporary unobserved components. 
The results of the present study revealed that for emerging markets, although the 
permanent component is statistically significant, flows were mostly dominated by 
the temporary components4. These unobserved temporary components may in- 
clude the influence of market sentiment and the herding behaviour of market pax- 
ticipants. Unlike the assets of mature financial markets of industrialized countries, 
emerging market assets may be viewed as relatively high-risk. Due to the scarcity 
and the asymmetry of information in developing countries, herding behaviour may 
rise among investors, and is often temporary. In a fundamentals-based approach, 
the pull variable 'credit rating' may be linked to market sentiment since these 
ratings offer financial markets an estimate of the probability that borrowers will 
default on their debt obligations. However, credit rating itself may not fully in- 
corporate market sentiment, since credit rating agencies themselves, having failed 
to predict the emergence of the East Asian crisis, have been criticized for their 
procyclical rating assignments and aggravation of the crisis'. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This paper has provided capital inflow forecasts to 32 emerging maxkets using 
a structural time series model in state space form estimated by maximum likeli- 
4Sarno and Taylor (1999) find that the temporary component is, however, relatively much 
smaller for private capital flows to Japan and Australia. 
5See Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz. (1999) 
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hood Kalman filtering methods for each of the capital inflows series examined. We 
employed a general-to-specific procedure where we started from the most general 
unobserved components model and tested down by imposing exclusion restric- 
tions on parameters found to be statistically insignificant at conventional nominal 
levels of significance. In choosing the most appropriate model for each country 
and capital flow, we relied on the coefficient of determination and on the Akaike 
information criterion. 
The analysis of the properties of capital flows using these unobserved com- 
ponents models suggest that a statistically significant nonstationary component 
is present in the data, but that this is generally dominated by a stationary, tem- 
porary component. That is to say, the bond, equity and loan flows to emerging 
markets may be regarded as largely temporary and reversible in nature. This 
coincides with international financial markets' classification of emerging market 
assets as risky assets. 
In general, the model projects lower capital inflows for 2001-2003 compared to 
a fundwnentals-based forecast (chapter 3), and a possible reversal of capital flows 
during 2001 due to the relatively large proportion of the temporary components 
and their temporary nature. The major difference between the Kalman filtering 
time series-based approach and the 'Pull versus push' fundamentals approach is 
that the time series approach involves the evolution of unobserved variables. The 
pure time series approach to capital flow forecasting incorporates both permanent 
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and temporary unobserved components. The results of the study revealed that for 
emerging markets, capital flows were mostly dominated by the temporary com- 
ponents. These unobserved temporary components may include the influence of 
market sentiment and the temporary herding behaviour of market participants 
because many emerging markets do not operate fully developed or information- 
ally transparent financial maxkets. In fundamentals based approach, the pull 
variable 'credit rating' may be linked to market sentiment since these ratings offer 
financial markets an estimate of the probability that borrowers will defatflt on 
their debt obligations. However, credit rating itself may not fully incorporate 
market sentiment, since credit rating agencies themselves, having failed to predict 
the emergence of the East Asian crisis, have been criticized for their procyclical 
rating assigm-nents and aggravation of the 1997-98 crisis. In this context, fu- 
ture studies involving the herding behaviour of credit rating agencies in assigning 
sovereign credit ratings for emerging markets could provide further insights into 
understanding the turbulence of capital flows and financial markets. This issue 
is taken up in chapter 5. 
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Table 4-2 
Table 4.2 Unobserved Compone t Estimation Result - Bond Flows 
Model Components Est. SID of error term 
AIR AIC<B[C> Coeff. of LB stat 
param. det. 
Argentina 5 Stc lvl, Fxd slp, Lvl: 77.131(0.126), 0.13 12.996 0.382 9.543 
AR(1) AR(l): 613.39(l. 000) <1 3.084> 
Brazil 3 Stc lvl, AR(1) Lvl: 66.258(0.092), 13.188 0.38 24.67 
AR(l): 690.27(l. 000) 0.17 <13.254> 
Bulgaria 6 Stc lvl, Fxd slp, Lvl: 0.000(0.000) 3.125 T51 0.681 
Irr Irr: 4.686(1.000) <3.19> 1 
China 4 Stc IvI, Irr Lvl: 33.067(0.132) 11.206 0.396 9.513 
lrr: 251.12(i. 000) <1 1.250> 
Colombia 4 Stc lvl, Irr Lvl: 8.979(0.056) 10.244 0.487 20.95 
lrr161.23(1.000) <1 0.288> 
Hungary 4 Stc lvl, Irr Lvl: 29.253(0.155) 10.661 0.406 8.545 
Irr: 189.06(l. 000) <10.705> 
India 4 Stc lvl, Irr Lvl: 17.212(0.1663) 9.468 0.412 5.697 
lrr: 103.53(l. 000) <9.512> , 
Indonesia 4 Stc lvl, I rr Lvl: 49.205(0.225) 11.021 0.437 13.53 
Irr: 218.49(l. 000) <1 1.065> 
Jamaica 6 Stc lvl, Fxd slp, Lvl: 0.000(0.000) 7.29 0.538 10.82 
Irr Irr37.605(i. 000) <7.356> 
Jordan 4 Stc lvI, Irr Lvl: 0.000(0.000) 4.569 0.509 0.464 
lrr9.7015(l. 000) <4.612> 
Korea 3 Stc lvl, AR(1) Lvl: 103.22(0.183) 12.887 0.411 9.866 
AR(l): 563.22(l. 000) <12.952> 
Lebannon 6 Stc lvl, Fxd slp, Lvl: 0.000(0.000) 9.964 0.536 19.36 
Irr lrr: 148.13(l. 000) <10.030> 
Uthuania 6 Stc lvl, Fxd slp, Lvl: 1.212(0.0344) 7.247 0.552 15.01 
Irr lrr: 32.265(l. 000) <7.312> 
Malaysia 4 Stc lvl, Irr Lvl: 15.879(0.0563) 11.361 0.452 3.245 
Irr: 281.80(l. 000) <1 1.405> 1 
MeAco 2 Stc lvl, AR(1), Lvl: 1 19.16(0.1693) 13.517 0.552 11.8 
Irr Irr703.95(1.000) <1 3.605> 
I 
AR(l): 193.49(0.275) 
Morocco 6 Stc lvl, Fxd slp, Lvl: 1.0590(o. 0359) 6.836 0.503 7.865 
Irr Irr29.500(l. 000) <6.902> 1 
Pakistan 6 Stc lvl, Fxd slp, Lvl: 1.658(0.0438) 7.334 0.551 12.68 
Irr lrr: 37,869(l. 000) <7.378> 
1 
Peru 4 Stc IVI, Irr Lvl: 0.477(0.0233) 6.081 0.512 10.93 
Irr: 20.438(l. 000) <6.124> 
Philippines 6 Stc lvl, Fxd slp, Lvl: 9.8824(0 ' 
0386) 11.159 0.528 14.89 
- 
Irr Irr-255.76(l. 000) <1 1.220 1 
iiu ssfa 5 Stc lvl, Fxd sip, Lvl: 62.284(0.0995) 12.992 0.284 13.93 
AR(1) AR(l): 626.1 1 (1.000) <13.079> 
Africa 4 Stc 1A Irr Lvl: 6.310(0.03-4-6) 10.468 0.481 16.9 
Irr: 182.27(i. 000) <10.512> 
Thailand 4 Stc lvl, Irr Lvl: 36.529(0.211 1) 10.54 0.462 14.65 
lrrl73.000(i. 000) <10.584> 
Turkey 5 Stc lvl, Fxd sip, Lvl: 14.326(0.0387) 11.91 0.394 -4.047 
AR(1) AR(l): 370.60(i. 000) <12.00> 
Ukraine 6 Stc lvl, Fxd slp, LVI: 11.906(0.1699) 8.701 0.246 36.66 
Irr Irr: 70.084(l. 000) <8.766> I "ýenezuela 6 Stc lvl, Fxd Slp, Lvl: 32.935(o. 076T)-- 12.239 0.489 ý 14.75 
I , irr Irr: 430.69(l. 000) 1 <12.304> i l 
- 
I 
Table 4-3 
Table 4.3 Unobserved Compone t Estimation Result Equity Flows 
Model Components Est SD of error term 
AR AIC<BIC> Coeff. of LB stat 
param det. 
Argentina 2 Stc M, AR(1), Irr Lvl: 0.000(0.000), -0.41 8.834 0.523 ý Q(10, t$): - 
AR(11): 18.557(0.238) <8.921> 10.44 
I rr. 78.042(l. 000) 
Brazil 4 Stc lvl, I rr Lvl: 9.213(0.0352), 13.188 0.435 Q(1 0,9)= 
I Iý irr261.43(i. 000) 0.168 ý <13.254> 2.121 
ý-hina 4 Stc IvI, Irr Lvl: 98.825(0.0961) 13.9908 0.528 Q(1 0,9)= 
Irr: 1028.7(i. 000) <1 3.0345>1 41.53 
Colombia 4 Stc IvI, Irr Lvl: 0.983(0.1 09) 4.532 0.462 Q(1 0.9)= 
lrr: 9.028(l. 000) <4.576> 31.33 
Egypt 3 'Stc lvI, AR(1) Lvl: 1.6358(0.045) -0.06 7.276 0.514 Q(1 0.9)= 
AR(l): 36.426(l. 000) <7.341 > 12.51 
Hungary 4 Stc IvI, Irr Lvl: 17.782(0.151) 9.7128 0.396 Q(1 0.9)= 
lrr: 1 17.88(l. 000) <9.756> 16.5 
Tncri-a 4- Stc M, I rr Lvl: 17.782(0.1508) 9.468 0.3963 0(110.9)= 
1rr: 1 17.88(1.000) <9.7565> 15.29 
Indonesia 4 Stc M. Irr Lvl: 8.2805(0.0621) 9.8702 0.4485 O(IO. 9)= 
Irr: 133.32(l. 000) <9.9139> 9.818 
Jordan 6 Stc lvl, Fxd sip, Lvl: 01587(0.000) 2.2988 0.4981 Q(10,9)= 
Irr Irr: 3.0261 (1.000) <2.3643> 15.94 
Korea 3 Stc M, AR(1) Lvl: 121.13(0.7265) -0.45 11.142 0.4333 O(IO, 8)= 
AR(l): 166.74(l. 000) <1 1.207> 7.488 
Lebannon 4 Stc M. I rr Lvl: 0.0000(0.000) 8.1677 
i 
0.5804 Q(10.9)= 
Irr-8; A Ascili nnni <A 91AA> 0.3563 
Uthuanla 6 Stc IvI, Fxd sip, Lvl: 0.2285(0.0175) 5.1886 1 0.5105 Q(10.9)= 
Irr I rrI13.068(1.000) <5.2542> 1.244 
i7a-laysia 3 Stc IvI, AR(1) Lvl: 3.5880(0.0565) 8.397 1 0.4795 Q(10,13)*ý 
l rr63.508(i. 000) <8.462> 7.743 
MeyJco 4 Stc IvI, Irr Lvl: 20.329(0.067) 11.532 0.4693 Q('10.9)= 1 
Irr3O5.33(i. 000) <1 1.576> 7.325 
Morocco 6 Stc IvI, Fxd sip, Lvl: 0.0000(0.000) 4.621 0.5211 Q(10,9)= 
Irr Irr-. 9.9001(1.000) 1 <4.687> 2.108 
Paldstan 3 Stc Ivl, AR(11) Lvl: 0.0000(0.000) 8.808 0.4241 Q(10.8)= 
AR(l): 80.175(i. 000) <8.873> 0.9822 
Papua 4 Stc IVI, Irr Lvl: 0.372(0.0094) 7.394 0.481 Q(1 0.9)= 
Guinea Irr36.679(1.000) <7.437> 1.437 
Peru 4 Stc: IvI, Irr Lvl: 0.0000(0.000) 8.815 0.5105 Q(10,9)= 
Irr-81.079(11.000) <8.8587> 1.676 
Philippines 4 Stc IvI. Irr Lvl: 5.4008(0.0796) 8.5525 0.501 1 Q(10.9)= 
lrr: 68.383(l. 000) <8.5962> 15.52 
Russia 3 Stc IvI, AR(1) Lvl: 1.242(0.025) 0.222 7.864 0.385 Q(10.8)= 
AR(l): 49.553(i. 000) <7.929> 15.65 
Africa 6 Stc IvI, Fxd sip, Lvl: 0.0000(0.000) 9.9676 0.5539 Q(1 0.9)= 
Irr Irr143.41(1.000) <1 0.033> 10.66 
Thailand 5 Stc IvI, Fxd sip, Lvl: 0.0000(0.000) 0.259 10-106 0.379 Q(10,9)= 
AR(l), AR(l): 152.54(i. 000) <10.194> 1 7.206 
Turkey 5 Stc IVI, Fxd sip, Lvl: 14.326(o. 0387) 10.064 0.446 Q(1 0,9)= 
AR(l), I.. AR(l): 370.60(i. 000) <10.151> 2.366 
Wnezuela 4 Stc IA Irr Lvl: 0.0000(0.000) 8.799 0.507 Q(1 0,9)= 
I I Irr: 80.430(1.000) 1 <8.843> 0.602 
Table 4-4 
*I- 
Table 4.4 Unobserved Compone t Estimation Result Syndicated Loan Flows 
Model Components Est. SD of error term 
AR AIC<BIC> Coeff. of LB stat 
param. det. 
FPýje-ntina 4 Sic lvl, Irr Lvi: 79.988(0.126), 13.062 0.516 Q(1 0,9)= 
I rr: 637.16(i. 000) <1 3.106> 4.218 
Brazil 6 Sic lvl, Fxd sip, Irr Lvl: 69.185(0.1130), 12.979 0.4713 Q(10,9)= 
Irr: 612.30(l. 000) <1 3.045> 28.79 
Bulgaria 4 Sic lvI, Irr Lvl: 0.3971(0.017). 6.309 0.515 1 Q(10.9)= 
Irr22.978(1.000) <6.352> 5.764 
Cameroon 5 Stc IvI, Fxd sip. LVI: 0.0000(0.000), 0.12 5.393 0.449 Q(10,9)= 
AR(1) AR(l): 14.449(l. 000) <5.480> 
1 
1.493 
3 Sic lvl, AR(1) Lvl: 57.335(0.112) -0.03 12.632 0.465 Q(1 0,8)= 
AR(l): 512.73(l. 000) <12.697> 6.398 
Colombia 4 Stc M, Irr Lvl: 28.535(0.1221), 11.052 0.301 Q(10,9)= I 
I I 
lrr: 233.61(l. 000) <1 1.096> 9.382 
Hungary 4 Stc IvI, Irr Lvl: 12.426(0.0877) 10.018 0.488 Q(1 0,9)= 
Irr149.69(1.000) <10.061> , 13.74 
India 4 Stc 1A Irr Lvl: 38.946(0.1414) 11.401 0.396 Q(1 0.9)= 
lrr-. 275.47(l. 000) <1 1.444> 11.69 
Indonesia 2 Stc lvl, AR(l), Irr Lvl: 132.32(0.302) -0.04 12.528 0.382 Q(1 0.9)= 
AR(l): 438.09(l. 000) <12.615> 13.55 
lrr: 0.000(0.000) 
Jamaica 4 SIC IVI, Irr Lvl: 0.000(0.000) 5.494 0.498 Q(1 0,9)= 
lrr: 15.411(l. 000) <5.538> 7.559 
Jordan 6 Sic lvI, Fxd sip, Irr Lvl: 10.955(0.669) 6.281 0.048 Q(1 0,9)= 
1 
Irr: 16.386(i. 000) <6.347> , 
191.9 
Korea 4 Stc lvl, Irr Lvl: 76.189(0.1970) 12.134 0.44 Q0 0.9)= 
Irr: 386.64(l. 000) <12.178> 13.54 
Lebannon 16 Stc lvI, Fxd sip, Irr Lvl: 1.454(0.0475) 6.921 0.5134 Q(10.9)= 
Irr: 30.594(i. 000) <6.984> 11.53 
Uthuani-a 6 Stc M, Fxd sip, Irr Lvl: 0.000(0.000) 6.642 0.5272 Q(10,9)= 
Irr*27.189(l. 000) <6.707> 9.935 
Malaysia 3 Sic 1A, AR(1) Lvl: 26.913(0.064) 12.189 0.4328 1 Q(10,8)= 1 
AR(l): 422.51 (1.000) <12.255> 4.315 
Me)dco 4 Stc Ivi, Irr Lvl: 58.911(0.095) 12.98 0.437 Q(10,9)= 
Irr: 620.60(11.000) <13.024> 3.62 
Morocco 3 Stc Ivi, AR(I) Lvl: 2.0327(o. 0158) 0.063 9.774 0.468 Q(IO'8)= 
AR(l): 129.13(i. 000) <9.840> 1.932 
Pakistan 4 Stc lvl, Irr Lvl: 15.143(o. 1236) 9.763 0.451 Q(I 0.9)= 
I rr: 122.51 (1.000) <9.806> 17 
Peru eru 6 Stc Ivi, Fxd sip. Irr Lvl: 0.000(0.000) 10.074 0.526 Q(1 0.9)= 
Irr: 151.28(l. 000) <10.140> 16.18 
Philippines hirippi 6 Stc Ivi, Fxd sip, Irr Lvl: 0.000(0.000) 10.765 0.4516 Q(I 0.9)= 
Irr: 213.71 (1.000) <10.831> 6.31 
Russia Russia 4 Stc Ivi, I rr Lvl: 75.829(0.1628) 12.484 0.384 384 Q(I 0.9)= 
Irr463.63(l. 000) <1 2.528> 22.67 
Africa 4 Sic Ivi, Irr Lvl: 31.041(0.068) 12.553 533 
E0. 
0.533 0.533 Q(10,9)= 
Irr510.21(1.000) <12.597> 43.88 
Thailand 4 Stc Ivi, Irr Lvl: 51.912(0.140) 11.995 f, A44 "A'. '. 0.411 0(1 0.9)= 
Irr. 370.97(l. 000) <12.038> 16.18 
Turkey 5 AR(1) Lvl: 41.227(0.1021) 12.144 0.4133 Q(1 0.9)= 
1 AR(l): 403.91 (1.000) < 12.231 > 31.06 
Venezuela 2 Sic lvl, AR(I), Irr Lvl: 32.441(0.1547) -0.97 10.938 0.474 Q(10,9)= AR(l): 12.336(0.0588) <1 1.025> 5.499 
Irr: 209.97(l. 000) 
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Chapter 5 
Contagion Factor in Credit 
Rating Agencies' Assessment of 
Sovereign Ratings: Evidence from 
the East Asian Emerging Markets 
5.1 Introduction 
Credit rating agencies play an important role in the dynamics of international 
financial markets. This is especially true for transactions in emerging market 
assets'. Developing countries tend to operate less developed domestic financial 
systems than mature markets, and therefore, investment decisions take place under 
the setting of highly asymmetric information. Foreign investors who axe generally 
less well informed about the domestic economic climate, face even larger uncer- 
tainty than domestic investors. Therefore, financial markets rely on credit rating 
I Reisen and Malzan (1999) found that the largest credit rating announcement effects were 
observed for emerging market sovereign spreads. 
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agencies to reduce the gap in the information as well as for constantly updating 
credit ratings. 
From the perspective of emerging markets, the global securities markets have 
become an increasingly important source of funding for emerging maxkets. The 
credit ratings assigned to sovereign and private sector issuers in developing coun- 
tries have often had important influences on the demand for emerging maxket, 
securities, and on capital flows into the region. Indeed, obtaining a sovereign 
credit rating has often been regarded as a prerequisite for issuing eurobonds; and 
some institutional investors are constrained to hold securities that have been clas- 
sified by rating agencies as "investment grade", as a result of official regulation or 
internal risk management practices. 
The sharp adjustment of sovereign credit ratings for many Asian emerging 
markets in periods since July 1997 have raised concerns about the credit rating 
process and their inability to predict the East Asian crisis (BIS, 1998; IMF, 
1998: World Bank, 1998). Specifically, credit rating agencies were subject to 
the criticism that they introduced a procyclical element into global capital flows - 
accelerating inflows to the region during the mid 1990s through improvements in 
ratings and then provoking a reversal Of Capital flows by sharply downgrading the 
sovereign ratings of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand all below-investment-grade. 
Such rating agencies' actions may exacerbate the emerging markets' cost of bor- 
rowing abroad and cause the supply of international capital to evaporate. 
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This chapter examines empirically whether there was "contagion! ' in the as- 
sessment of Asian emerging market sovereign credit ratings. It tests whether 
agencies, after failing to predict the emergence of the East Asian crisis, down- 
graded the rating of Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines excessively and 
contagiously beyond what economic fundamentals would justify, in order to re- 
cover from the damage to their reputation. In particular, "contagiod' is viewed 
as a latent but unobservable variable common to the credit ratings of all of these 
countries. The state space form and the Kalman filter is used to extract the unob- 
served variable from observed credit ratings. The credit ratings employed in this 
study axe those produced by the two largest credit rating agencies, Moody's and 
Standard and Poor's (S&P) - They include the ratings of Thailand, Philippines, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Korea, the countries most severely hit by 1997-98 Asian 
crisis. Earlier studies have focused on verifying whether credit rating agencies 
can add to the dynamics of financial crisis (e. g. see R&en and Malzan, 1999). 
They also examined the relationship between the changes in sovereign ratings 
and the changes in the spread between the yields on the US treasury bonds and 
other assets. However, research on the rating process and agencies' contagious 
assessment of the health of sovereigns from one country to the next seem limited. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to examine if such contagious assessment did 
take place. 
The empirical results show that sovereign credit ratings were assessed con- 
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tagiously and that an event in one country did indeed significantly influence the 
ratings of other countries beyond what could be explained by the economic fun- 
damentals. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as f6flows. Section 5.2 discusses 
the sovereign rating criteria and the rating practices of the agencies. It also 
considers the role of credit rating agencies during the Asian crises and discusses 
the failure of agencies to warn the markets of the economic turmoil that was to 
foUow. Section 5.3 describes the data, and examines whether the huge downgrade 
in Asian emerging markets' sovereign ratings involved contagion. It also proposes 
a possible explanation behind contagious conservative assessments by credit rating 
agencies. Section 5.4 presents a conclusion. 
5.2 The Credit Rating Process 
5.2.1 Sovereign Rating Criteria and Rating Practice 
The two major credit rating agencies, Moody's (1998) and S&P (1999, a) ar- 
gue that they do not regard their ratings as providing either a prediction of the 
tinjing of default or an indication of the absolute level of risk associated with a 
particular financial obligation. Moreover, they declare that an issuer credit rating 
is not a recommendation to purchase, sell, or hold financial obligation issued by 
an obligator, as it does not comment on market price or suitability for a particulax 
investor. However, during 1990s, global securities markets have become an in- 
81 
creasingly important source of funding for many emerging markets. In this regard, 
credit rating agencies, such as Standaxd and Poor's (S&P) and Moody's Investors 
Service (Moody's) have become institutions which exercise strong impact on both 
the cost of funding and the willingness of major investors to hold certain types 
of instruments. The growing reliance on credit ratings in the regulatory process, 
such as the use of ratings in a revised version of the Basel capital requirement 
proposed by the Task Force on Future of Capital Regulation of the Basel Com- 
mittee on Banking Supervision have contributed to placing further weight on the 
role of credit rating agencies. 
Although, ratings are inevitably influenced by cyclical factors, rating agen- 
cies point out that long-term foreign currency debt ratings try to see through 
economic, political, credit and commodity cycles. Therefore, a recession or tight- 
ening of global liquidity should not, by itself, be tied to fundamental factors such 
as secular trends (see S&P (19991b) ). The S&P (1998) divides the factors into 
eight categories (see Table 5.1). Each category relates two key aspects of credit 
risk, i. e. economic and political risk. Economic risk addresses the governments' 
ability to repay its debts on time. It is a function of both qualitative and quan- 
titative factors. The transformation of S&P's and Moody's ordinal rating scales 
into a ntunerical scale is presented in Table 5.2. 
Most of the major credit rating agencies list the relevant economic and political 
factors they consider in assessing credit ratings, however, they do not reveal the 
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weights they assign to each factors and the relative importance of non-quantifiable 
factors such as government stability. Agencies emphasize that they do not use a 
specific formula to combine the various political and economic factors in deciding 
an overall rating. However, a number of empirical studies have helped to shed 
light on factors that have historically received the greatest weights in the decision 
making procesO, and often indicate the likely direction of the rating change that 
they anticipate will occur. In Moody's, roughly two thirds of all reviews have 
restflted in a rating change. 
5.2.2 Rating Agencies and the East Asian Crisis: Did they 
miss the crisis? 
In examining whether the agencies failed during the Asian crisis, one possible 
starting point is to consider whether sovereign ratings were changed on time in 
response to predictable changes in default risk. Table 5.3 reports the sovereign 
credit ratings history up to the crisis for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thai- 
land according to the rating assigned to these countries by Moody's and S&P. 
Downgradings were performed only in December 1997 for Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Korea was downgraded in November 1997. Moody's downgraded Thailand at the 
beginning of April, 1997 as the crisis was starting, but S&P did not downgrade 
Thailand until September, 1997, well into crisis. Except for Malaysia, all the 
2Cantor and Packer (1996) and subsequently Juttner and McCarthy (1998) examined the 
determinants of the levels of Moody's and S&Ps ratings for a range of mature and emerging 
market economies in the mid-1990s. 
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countries were downgraded from investment to below-investment-grade. Refer- 
ring to Moody's, Malaysia was downgraded four notches (from Al to Baa2), and 
Thailand was downgraded five notches (from A2 to Baa. 3). The largest down- 
gradings were for Indonesia and Korea (six notches) from Baa3 to Caa3, and from 
Al to Bal. The corrections of sovereign ratings of Asian countries in 1997-98 
were, collectively, the laxgest and the most abrupt changes in the modern history 
of credit ratings. 
Market participants raised criticisms that credit rating agencies were not only 
lax in foreseeing the vulnerabilities of the countries that eventually succumbed to 
crises, but also gave the impression that they were judging a general melt-down 
in this region. Downgading of tMs magnitude was not only unusual but was 
a 
-3 lso decided late in the crisis, thereby exacerbating market price movements and 
increasing instability (IMF (1998) ). 
5.3 Were Asian Emerging Markets Downgraded 
'Contagiously? ' 
Academics and investors often argue that sovereign ratings trigger pronounced 
boom-bust cycles ( see e. g. Monfort and Mulder, 1999 ). This means that ini- 
tially small capital outflows from an emerging market and subsequently widening 
spreads lead rating agencies to downgrade the country in question. TMs, in turn, 
is interpreted by many investors as a signal to withdraw their capital. As a result, 
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the spreads become even larger and agencies continue to downgrade, forming a 
vicious spiral that can trigger a massive evaporation of capital in the international 
financial markets. 
If we view this as a vertical process of credit rating correction and capital evap- 
oration, a horizontal process would involve a series of downgradings in sovereign 
ratings elsewhere in the region, where a downgrading in a country is followed by 
subsequent downgradings in other countries, leading to massive capital flight from 
the region. Credit rating agencies, having failed to predict the emergence of the 
crisis, may have had incentives to become more conservative and downgrade other 
markets in Asia since failing to predict another crisis, if there were to be another 
one, would cost them a loss of reputation that would be difficult to restore. 
Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) demonstrate the evidence from East Asia, using 
both linear and non-linear cardinalisation methods, that credit ratings assigned 
during Asian crisis period were procyclical. They show that for Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand, the actual ratings assigned to them before the Asian crisis 
were higher than what economic fundamentals would waxrant. However, after the 
crisis, the actual ratings dropped much more sharply than the model predicted 
rating, suggesting that the downgrades were larger than economic fundamentals 
wouldjustify. Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to examine whether 
the two major credit rating agencies, MoodY's and S&P, made sovereign rating 
assessments that were not solely based on the list of criteria they provided, but 
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that they relied on negative sentiment of the whole region and downgraded the 
countries contagiously. Hence instead of two, there are three types of explana- 
tory variables influencing the ratings; economic risk (usually quantitative factor), 
political risk (usually qualitative factor), and the contagion factor. 
5.3.1 Data 
The data used for this research include those identified by Cantor and Packer 
(1996) as major quantifiable determinants of the sovereign rating: per capita in- 
come, GDP growth, inflation, fiscal and external balance, economic development 
and default history. After the Asian crisis, rating agencies have noted the impor- 
tance of short-term foreign currency debt in evaluating sovereign risk. Therefore, 
the ratio of short term debt over foreign currency reserves is used to measure a 
country's short-term foreign currency liquidity condition. The data reflecting the 
political risk are difficult to quantify and are excluded from the analysis. 
Sovereign ratings include monthly ratings of Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Korea by Moody's and S&P. They cover ratings from January 1990 
for Thailand, from July 1993 for Philippines, January 1990 for Malaysia, March 
1994 for Indonesia and January 1990 for Korea. All the data end in December 
2000. Although the two agencies use different symbols in assessing credit risk, 
every S&P scale has its counterpart in Moody's rating scale. This correspondence 
permits a linear transformation into numbers (see Kraeusel, 2000). 
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5.3.2 Isolating the Contagion Factor using the State Space 
Form and Kalman Filter3 
5.3.2.1 State Space and Kalman Filtering 
The contagion factor in credit rating agencies' rating assigmnent can be ex- 
amined by employing the state-space form and unobserved components model 
suggested by Kalman (1960) and Harvey (1981,1989). A state space model con- 
sists of two equations: a measurement equation that describes the relationship 
between observed variables and unobserved state variables, and the transition 
equation that demonstrates the evolution of the unobserved variable. 
Measurement equation: 
Yit = Xi, t-l A! +H- Bt +, -it cit - iid n (0, R) 
rRansition equation : 
Bt =ii+F. Bt-, +vt wt - iidN(O, Q) (5.2) 
E(Eit , vt) : -- 0 (5.3) 
3The discussion is similar to that given in section 2.2.4-2.2.5 in chapter 2, and is included 
here for completeness. 
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Yit is a nxl vector of variable observed at time t, Bt is a kxl vector of 
unobserved state variables that evolves in autoregressive form. H is a nx 1 matrix 
that links the observed Yit with unobserved Bt, U is kx 1 vector of constants, vt is 
kX 1. A is a matrix of parameters. If Yit is to represent the sovereign credit ratings 
of country i at time t, equation (1.2) can be interpreted as sovereign ratings of a 
country specific economic factor Xi, t-,, unobserved and slowly decaying temporary 
contagion Bt, and purely temporaxy, zero persistent cit. Contagion, Bt, is common 
for all 5 countries under the study, and evolves in autoregressive' form. 
The Kalman filter, a recursive procedure for computing an optimal estimate 
of the unobserved state vector Bt, is then applied. In this way, it is possible to 
estimate the unobserved component and provide a minimum mean squared error 
estimate of Bt given the appropriate information set'. The unknown parameters 
in the state space form can be estimated by maximum likelihood Kalman filtering 
methods (Harvey, 1983; Cubertson et al. 1992), and can be used to predict and 
update the unobserved state variable Bt at the end of each period. 
5.3.2.2 Modelling the Influence of Contagion Factor in Assessment of 
Sovereign Ratings 
The modeffing of currency crisis contagion used in this paper is a modified ver- 
sion of basic state space model and Kalman filter. Let Yjt be the sovereign ratings 
41t is not limited to AR(1), but can be AR(n) as long as it is finite. 
5 Information set includes the parameters U, A, F, R and Q. 
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5 countries (i=l.. 5) under study by Moody's or S&P, and 
ýt be the unobserved 
contagion factor common in all 5 countries. 
Yit = (Xi, t-l - A! ) + (-yi - 
ýt) +, -it 
pt (Pt-1 + 02 (Ot-2 +Lot 
Eit --` Vil 6i, t-l+ýOQ Ei, t-2+lEit 
i=1,2,3,4,5,6 (5.4) 
wt - iidN(O, 1) (5.5) 
cit - iidN(O, a2i) (5.6) 
U2 is set to 1 to normalize the common component. The the roots of (1 - w 
ý, L - 02L 2)=O and (1 - 01L - 
02L2)=O, i=L. 5 He outside the unit circle, and 
the shodcs are assumed to be independent, i. e. E(cit -vt) = 0. The common 
component, 3t enters each equation of Yit with different weights, yi, i=L. 5. For 
each of the 5 series, (Xi, t-1 - W) + eit represents individual, country's economic 
and political risk factors. 
The first population moment for the ith indicator Yit consists of two compo- 
nents. 
E(Yit) = (Xi, t-, - W) + (5.7) 
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However, from the corresponding sample first moment Yj, one can not sepa- 
rately identify Xj, t-1 - A! and -yj6. This causes a problem in deriving the max- 
imum likelihood estimator. Such an identification problem can be avoided by 
demeaning, that is subtracting the mean value from original value. 
Let yit = Yit - Vi = -yi ( 
ýt 
- 6) + Eit and define Ot = 
ýt 
- 6, and xit = xit - Yi, 
hence we have 
yit = Aixit + -ti, 6t + Eit 
(5-8) 
Ot 
--: * 
(01 * Pt-1) + 
(02 
* #8t-2) 
+ Wt 
Cit -': -- Vil Ei, t-1 
+ Wi2 Ei, t-2 + Eit 
wt - iidN(O, 1) (5.9) 
cit - iidN(O, a'i) (5.10) 
The above model in deviation from means is written in the state space form 
and the Kalman filter is available for maximum likelihood estimation of the model 
based on the prediction error decomposition, as well as for inference on Pt. The 
measurement and transition equation are in identical form as section 2.2.5. 
Once the estimates of parameters using maximum likelihood estimation method 
are calculated, one can run the Kalman filter to get OtIt, the contagion factor in- 
fluencing the assignment of sovereign ratings at time t, given information up to 
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time t. 
5.3.3 Estimation Results 
Figure 5.2 and 5.3 in the appendix display the estimates of the 'contagion 
factor' in credit rating assig=ents by Moody's and S&P respectively. The value 
of the contagion variable can be interpreted as an index representing the dynamics 
of credit rating agency's negative sentiment towards the Asian emerging markets 
as an investment target. More important than the absolute value of the contagion 
factor is its sudden change in direction during the time of huge downgradings in 
sovereign ratings. S&P downgraded Thailand in September 1997, and Moody's 
downgraded Thailand in April 1997. Malaysia and Indonesia were downgraded 
in December 1997, and Korea on October 1997. The contagion factor also shows 
a sudden drop during this time, from September 1997 to first half of 1998 for both 
the Moody's and S&P. 
It is important to keep in mind that historically, sovereign ratings have been 
relatively stable. Indeed, since the agencies argue that they try to see through eco- 
nomic, political, credit and commodity cycles, a recession or tightening of global 
liquidity should not, in itself, be an occasion for a downgrade. In the period prior 
to the East Asian crisis, there had been only modest rating actions and most 
Asian countries had investment-grade ratine. Most market participants have 
G China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan Provence of China 
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argued that these rating actions gave only a limited warning of the subsequent 
market turmoil. Moreover, a number of observers have argued that, in the agen- 
cies" report on the Asian countries, there was seemingly a "disconnect" between 
the often critical and subsequently proven accurate, assessments of the financial 
sector weaknesses in the Asian economies and the investment-grade ratings that 
they were assigned. 
Why does a crisis in one country lead rating agencies to be excessively con- 
servative in assessing ratings to other countries in the same league? Although 
there may be more than one explanation, I would like to argue that the contagion 
factor plays an important role in the assessment of sovereign ratings because of 
the asymmetric valuation of costs and benefits associated with accuracy in the 
ratings assignment. That is, the cost the rating agencies must bear when they 
make inaccurate assessments of sovereign ratings will result in the loss of repu- 
tation which is much greater than the benefit they would gain had they made 
accurate judgements. ROm the perspective of an analyst in the credit rating 
agency or any other private institutions, their correct predictions would mean ex- 
tra bonus on their salaries whereas failure to do so may be as harsh as dismissal 
from their position. Credit rating agencies missed the emergence of East Asian 
crisis. Failing to predict another crisis would cause irrecoverable damage to their 
reputation. They would have incentives to become excessively conservative with 
other countries in the same league and downgrade their ratings beyond what the 
and Thailand all carried investment-grade ratings at the beginning of July 1997. 
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economic fundamentals would warrant. 
5.4 Conclusion and Policy Implication 
This paper has demonstrated that in addition to economic factors and political 
risks, the "contagion factor" plays an important role in assessment of sovereign 
credit ratings in Asian emerging markets. The results from state space model and 
Kalman filtering involving unobserved vaxiables illustrate that during the period 
of Asian crisis, contagion, which can be interpreted as the negative sentiment 
over the whole Asian emerging markets as investment targets, contributed to the 
agencies' huge downgrading of ratings in the region. These sharp downgradings 
aggravated further outflow of capitals from the region, leading to a costly financial 
crisis. 
Having failed to give a significant warning of the market turmoil in Asian 
emerging markets, rating agencies would have an incentive to downgrade ratings 
of other countries in the same league contagiously, and to a level below that which 
the economic fundamentals would justify, in order to recover from the damage to 
their reputation. For rating agencies, the cost of inaccurate prediction would 
- outweigh the benefit of correct prediction. Failure to predict a second crisis in 
another country would cause them irrecoverable reputational damage, therefore 
agencies would have incentives to become excessively conservative. 
Since the crisis, the IMF has criticized the lack of statistical methodology and 
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I 
the assessment techniques such as extensive scenario analysis, sensitivity analy- 
sis and stress testing. In addition to this, the results of this research suggest 
that agencies should provide further transparency in their rating techniques and 
A- 
processes. Agencies list the factors they consider in sovereign rating assessment, 
but do not specify how they derive at their rating decisions. As the results show, 
"contagion! ' may lead to excessively conservative rating assignments, which causes 
international capital to evaporate from that region. Providing transparency in 
their rating process and techniques could prevent contagious risk assessment in 
other countries. 
94 
Table 5.1 
Table 5.1 S&P's Sovereign Rating Methodology Profile 
Political Risk 
Form of government and adaptability of political institutions 
Extent of Popular Participation 
Orderliness of leadership succession 
Degree of consensus on economic policy objectives 
Integration in global trade and financial system 
Internal and external security risks 
Income and Economic Structure 
Living Standards, income, and wealth distribution 
Market vs. non-market economy 
Resources endowments and degree of diversification 
Economic Growth Prospects 
Size and composition of savings and investment 
Rate and pattern of economic growth 
TFis-cal Flexibility 
General government operating and total burden balances 
Tax competitiveness and tax-raising flexibility 
Spending pressures 
Public Debt Burden 
General government financial assets 
Public debt and interest burden 
Currency composition and structure of public debt 
Pension liabilities 
Banking, corporate, other contingent liabilities 
Price Stability 
Trends in price inflation 
Rates of money and credit growth 
Exchange rate policy 
Degree of central bank autonomy 
Balance of Payments Flexibility 
Impact of fiscal and monetary policies on external accounts 
Structure of the current account 
Composition of capital flows 
External Debt and Liquidity 
Size and currency composition of public external debt 
Importance of banks and other public and private entities as 
contingent liabilities 
Maturity structure and debt service burden 
Level and composition of reserves and other public external assets 
Debt service track record 
Table 5.2 
Table 5.2 Transformation of S&P's and Mood)(s Ordinal Rating 
Scales into a Numerical Scale 
S&P's Mood)(s Scale 
AAA Aaa 20 
AA+ Aal 19 
AA Aa2 18 
AA- Aa3 17 
A+ Al 16 
A A2 15 
A- A3 14 
BBB+ Baal 13 
BBB Baa2 12 
BBB- Baa3 11 
Bal 10 
BB Ba2 9 
BB- Ba3 8 
B+ BI 7 
B B2 6 
B- B3 5 
CCC+ Caal 4 
ccc Caa2 3 
ccc- Caa3 2 
ICC Ca 1 
JD IC 
Table 5.3 
Table 5.3 Sovereign Rating History for East Asian Crisis Countries 
Indon esia Kor ea Mal ysia Thail and 
Year Moody's S&P Moodys S&P Moody's S&P Moody's S&P 
1986 A2 Nov 
1988 A+ Oct 
1989 l Baal Dec A- Mar A2 Aug A- Jun 
90 Al Apr Dec - 
1 '992 BBB-July 
1993 j Baa3Mar A2 Nov 
1994 A+ Dec A Dec 
1995 AA- ý Al Mar 
1996 BBBJuly 
1997 Bal Dec BB+ Dec A3 Nov 
Bal Dec 
A+ Oct 
A- Nov 
B+ Dec 
A2 Dec A Dec A3 Apr 
Baal Oct 
Baa3 Nov 
Bal Dec 
ý-ýe 
p 
BBB Oct 
1998 B2 Jan 
B3 Mar 
B Jan 
B- Mar 
CCC+ 
imay 
BB+/B 
Aug 
Baa2 Jul 
Baa3Sep 
A-/A-2 
Apr 
A-2, BBB+ 
July 
A-3/BBB- 
Sep 
A-31BBB 
Jan 
BBB- 
Aug 
Table 5.4 
Table 5.4 Estimations and Standard Errors of Parameters 
1. Gamma 1-5 are coefficients of the contagion factor for Thailand, Philippine, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Korea respectively. 
2. and *** in table 4 indicate 1%, 5% and 10% of significance respectively. 
Fi! )Llre 5.1 
Figure 5.1 Sovereign Credit Ratings by Moody's and S&P 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have examined the dynamics of emerging market economies 
focusing on their interactions vis-a-vis global financial markets. Taking the case 
of 1997-98 East Asian crisis, we created a quantitative index of the unobservable 
variable 'contagion', and examined how it contributed to the market turbulence. 
To our knowledge, ours is the only attempt to isolate " contagiod' as a sole rariable. 
We also identified the crisis transmission channel using this contagion index. 
Noting the significance of foreign capital inflows in financing the growth in 
Asian economies, we forecast capital inflows to the region using both fundamentals- 
based and the time series-based approach. Our focus then shifted to sovereign 
rating agencies as they play a crucial role in determining the size of capital flows 
to the region. 
In chapter 2, we isolated the unobservable variable "contagion! ' and created 
an index of level of contagion from the exchange market pressures of five Asian 
countries most severely hit by the crisis. The index manifested exceptionally 
high level of contagion during the peak of Asian crisis, July 1997 to January 
1998. We extended our research to show that the major contagion channel was 
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macroeconomic similarity in financial variables rather than trade linkages. That 
is, crisis spread to other countries that shared macroeconomic similarities rather 
than to those who were linked by bilateral trade or trade competition in the third 
market. Specifically, the Mgh level of domestic credit proved to be most important 
variable explaining the transmission of crisis in the Asian countries. 
As the domestic credits were mostly financed by foreign capitals in Asian 
0- 
emerging markets, chapter 3 and 4 project capital flows to 32 emerging markets 
in the world using the fundamentals-based and the time series-based approach 
respectively. Forecasts under the worst case scenarios showed that the global real 
variable, namely the growth rate in the US, had a significant influence on deter- 
mining size of flows to developing countries. It was also revealed that the increase 
in capital flows to the region was closely linked with corresponding upgradings in 
sovereign ratings of the countries under study. 
In relation to the importance of sovereign credit ratings on demand for emerg- 
ing market securities, chapter 5 investigated whether the major credit rating agen- 
cies downgraded sovereign ratings of countries excessively and contagiously from 
one country to another during the Asian crisis period. The results of the anal- 
ysis supported the view that credit rating agencies downgraded sovereign ratings 
in order to restore their reputation. Having failed to predict the emergence of 
crisis, agencies became increasingly conservative and downgraded other emerging 
markets, because failing to predict another crisis would render their reputation 
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irrecoverable. 
Three broad policy implications emerge from this thesis. The first is that cur- 
rency crisis may occur or become magnified by events in other countries through 
contagion. Therefore, it is important that policy makers in international financial 
institutions monitor carefully the movements in international capital markets, and 
assess the risks of a country together with global financial specialists. From the 
emerging maikets' point of view, it is essential that they practice stricter finan- 
cial supervision and regulation to control the excessive inflow and outflow of "hot 
money". 
The second is that emerging maxkets need to focus on developing their do- 
mestic capital markets. This will enable them to widen the loan sources and to 
avoid excessive short-term financing, in order to minimize negative shocks in the 
case of rapid capital outflow. 
The third is that the new international financial structure should encourage 
the credit rating agencies to provide further transparency in their rating tech- 
niques and processes. Agencies list the factors they consider in sovereign rating 
assessment, but do not specify how they arrive at their rating decisions. The 
results of this thesis showed that "contagioe' may lead to excessively conserva- 
tive rating assignments, which causes international capital to evaporate from that 
region. Therefore, enforcing the rating agencies to provide transparency in their 
rating process and teclmiques could prevent excessive and contagious sovereign 
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downgradings in other countries. 
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